Arab News Blog

MEPGS: excerpts:
    President Obama’s unusual, if not unprecedented background
press briefing last week on US policy towards Iran surprised even
veteran Administration officials.  ”It shows not only the
importance the President places on reining in Iran’s nuclear
program but the success he feels he has achieved so far in
reaching that goal,” said one State Department official.  Senior
US officials make no secret of their pride in the
Administration’s accomplishments.  ”Look at what we have been
able to do since taking office,” said one senior US official.
“When we came into office, Iran was on a roll; highly confident
that international pressure could be easily withstood.  Now,
unable to demonize the US led by this President, they have one
suffered one after another setbacks.” …….”  Veteran
State Department officials acknowledge, as one put it this week,
“The US is in a better place [with Iran]” due to a number of
Obama Administration initiatives, including the “reset” in
relations with Russia.  But this official, reflecting the views
of a number of his colleagues, insists that while there may be
cracks in the Iranian system, it is far from broken.  Even Joint
Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen’s statement that the US has
military plans in case of conflict with Iran was greeted with a
yawn at the State Department.  Said one senior official, “The
only way to take the military option off the table is to disarm.”
    While there is no indication that the Administration is
seriously considering a military option at this stage, top US
officials are convinced that should the current strategy not
alter Iran’s drive to achieve a nuclear weapon, Israel will act
militarily.  And while these officials are not above using the
threat of unilateral Israeli action as an incentive to gain
international support for its diplomatic offensive against Iran,
they also say it is not their fear of Israeli action alone that
motivates them.  ”If we don’t succeed, our friends throughout the
region will be endangered,” says one key US official.  ”Saudi
Arabia, no less than Israel will be affected.
    As a result, the President, according to well-placed
sources, has made Iran his number one security objective.  ”In
every conversation with his Russian and Chinese counterparts, the
President has made discussion about Iran the centerpiece,” says
one top Administration official. Still, some US analysts argue to
adopt a more “realistic” approach to what they believe is the
inevitability of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, especially since
it appears that Teheran has already attained “nuclear
capability.”……     Even hard liners within the Administration admit that
diverting Iran from its present course by means of threats and
economic sanctions has its limitations. …. Most important, however, is the willingness, in some case
eagerness of US and European officials to again engage in a
dialogue with Iran.  According to informed sources, Iran has made
a number of outreaches to the US and others previously engaged in
talks and now it is considered a distinct possibility that some
kind of talks with US, Russian, Chinese, French, British and
German officials [Known as the "P-5+1] about Iran’s nuclear
program could well take place as early as next month.
    While some US and European officials are in no hurry to
resume a dialogue with Iran, these same officials are more than
eager to see talks begin as soon as possible between Israel and
the Palestinian Authority.  With Israel’s ten month partial
settlement freeze about to run out, a steady stream of US and
European officials have been making their views known to
Palestinian leader Abu Mazen.  And even those most sympathetic to
his political weakness, have made no secret of their frustration
with their inability to get him to agree to direct talks.  ”He is
a good man,” says one veteran US official who has known Abu Mazen
for many years.  ”But he is feckless.”  
    What is particularly frustrating to a number of officials is
that, with qualified Arab backing for direct talks and Israeli
embrace of them, Abu Mazen has put himself in the position of
spoiler.  ”Abu Mazen really wants a peace deal.  We’re not so
sure about Bibi [Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu], says one
veteran US official. Other, more senior US officials say that
President Obama is convinced that Netanyahu is serious about
making an acceptable deal.  They say that in recognition of this
fact, the Administration adjusted its approach to dealing with
the Israeli Prime Minister.  ”The President understood that the
Israelis needed to feel comfortable,” said one well-placed US
official.  He also added “The old way wasn’t working.”
    White House support for Israel in the recent flare-up at the
Lebanese border was added evidence of this new sensitivity.
Unlike State Department officials who emphasized that the Israeli
military did not give sufficient warning of its planned “brush
clearing” activities near the border, senior White House
officials blamed the Lebanese Army for not obeying “rules of
engagement” and UNIFIL, the United Nation’s peacekeepers in
southern Lebanon for not living up to their mission.

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“Alarm signals from the Middle East are a regular feature of the high summer. However, the August 4th incident between Israel and Lebanon prompted instant intervention from the top of the Administration. Secretary of State Clinton engaged rapidly with the Israeli leadership to urge calm while UN Ambassador Susan Rice took urgent action with the Security Council. US intelligence officials are worried that Israel may be looking to launch a strike deep into Lebanon. For the moment, US officials believe the threat is contained but they will remain very vigilant against the possibility of another flare-up over the coming weeks. If that happens, US diplomatic intervention to prevent a wider war will be instant. Another perennial of the summer months is speculation about a US or Israeli attack on Iran. On August 4th, President Obama briefed a small group of journalists about his hopes that it may still be possible to revive the deal to exchange nuclear fuel with Iran. This came after remarks Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, to the effect that the US has prepared a contingency plan for air strikes against Iran. Although reports of the Obama meeting differ, our understanding from contacts inside the Administration that the US leadership remains overwhelmingly opposed to military action against Iran. They are also confident that they can deter Israel from unilateral action. The rising tensions over Lebanon and the tacit Israeli deferment to the US over Iran are, however, exacting a toll on the Middle East peace process. Here, it is difficult to find any senior Administration official who believes progress is within reach. Along with increasing doubts about the way forward in Afghanistan, this adds up to a somber backdrop for Obama as he heads into his summer vacation. The weak jobs picture remains at the top of his priorities.”

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SWOOP/ here

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MEPGS: Excerpts:

"... The United Nations Security Council will take up the new Iran sanctions resolution as early as next week.  Now that the P- 5 (Russia, China, France, Britain and the US) have agreed on the text, serious lobbying to gain as many votes as possible has begun.  US officials are confident of ten votes in the fifteen member chamber.  They also believe in the end, both Uganda and Nigeria will raise the total to twelve.  The hold outs remain Lebanon, Turkey and Brazil; the latter two, of course, being the architects of last week's ill-fated attempt at a deal with Iran to head off this round of UN sanctions......      On paper, this round of sanctions is far from harsh.  References to potentially painful measures, such as targeting Iran's Central Bank, are contained in the preamble to the resolution and, as such, do not carry legal weight.  However, veteran observers believe that, in time, such distinctions will fade......      The Administration's somewhat cavalier approach to the Congress ["These people are just show boating," said one senior US official this week), is in stark contrast to its assiduous wooing of even the most recalcitrant international players.  For example, President Obama spent a hour on the phone with Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan the day after his abortive deal with the Iranians.  This week he met with Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who, at best, is expected to instruct his delegation to abstain on the UN vote.  There is sympathy for Hariri's position since the Iranian backed Hezbollah movement is widely considered to control the most powerful military force in Lebanon.  But, according to informed sources, Hariri's claim that Lebanon needed to represent the Arab world's interests did not elicit much sympathy.  For one thing, much of the Arab world, albeit quietly and discreetly, supports US efforts to thwart Iran's nuclear ambitions.      Lebanon is also facing another, potentially even more

dangerous problem with Hezbollah.....



While much attention has been focused on the Scuds, US officials say the Fatah-110 is a more dangerous weapon, smaller and more easily operated.  As one top US official says, "It is a real `game-changer'." ..      The Administration has repeatedly made representations to the Syrians about the danger of adding these missiles to Hezbollah's arsenal.  This week, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Kerry, at the Administration's request delivered the latest warning.  The Israelis believe that the Scuds and/or Fatah 110's have already crossed into Lebanon.  US intelligence is not as certain, believing perhaps that Hezbollah is training on these weapons still inside Syria.  However, the Administration has apparently given Israel a "green light" to take out the missiles, should they locate them inside Lebanon.  As one key US official put it this week, "I just hope it is a surgical strike."      US-Israeli relations appear to be improving across-the- board.  White House Chief of Staff, Rahm Emmanuel, in Israel this week for his son's Bar Mitzvah (and a highly anticipated visit to an Israeli air force base) is expected to invite Prime Minister Netanyahu to Washington for a visit with the President in the coming weeks.....And there is even talk of a possible visit to Israel by the President should the current round of "proximity talks" between Israel and the Palestinians, shepherded by Special Envoy George Mitchell, lead to direct talks in September.      Domestic political considerations have also factored into helping create a new warmth between the Obama Administration and the Netanyahu government.  Two weeks ago forty Jewish Members of Congress met with the President to express their anxiety over what some say is the parlous state of relations between the two countries.  Many, already concerned about the current anti- incumbent climate, see some of their Jewish supporters backing away, in part, because of the perceived tensions between the President and the current Israeli government." 

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FB Ali via SST/ here

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USNews&WR/ here

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Yesterday afternoon CNAS released another of the papers which has been keeping me away from the blog:   America’s Extended Hand:  An Assessment of the Obama Administration’s Global Engagement Strategy, written with my former Elliott School colleague and current CNAS Vice President Kristin Lord. This report started out with a meeting I convened in September with a group of high-level administration officials to talk about the follow-up to Cairo and the overall approach to public diplomacy.   Kristin and I originally planned to do a 5 page policy brief, but then it began to grow. We ended up talking to around 50 current and former government officials involved with public diplomacy and strategic communications, and greatly expanding the scope of the analysis. America’s Extended Hand presents a comprehensive overview of how the Obama administration thinks about public engagement, how it has attempted to reorganize the government to deliver on that vision, and how it has performed across a number of crucial issues (including Muslim engagement, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iran, China, democracy promotion, and combating violent extremism).  

We argue that the administration has succeeded in its initial goal of "re-starting" America’s relations with global publics, taking advantage of the fresh start offered by the Presidential transition, and has effectively used President Obama’s particular gifts to focus attention and global debate on issues which he has identified as key American priorities. The administration has been less successful, however, at executing engagement campaigns in support of specific tactical objectives, at adapting to changing circumstances and at meeting the high expectations generated by those speeches. With a palpable sense of the Obama bubble deflating, and a pernicious consensus emerging of a "say-do" gap in which the U.S. fails to deliver on its highly public promises, we urge the administration to do more to prepare the ground and to follow through on its engagement.  

America’s Extended Hand goes into considerable detail about the administration’s philosophy, its efforts to reshape the inter-agency process and individual government agencies (from the Defense Department and State Department to the NSC and the BBG), and its efforts across a range of issue areas.  And it makes a number of specific recommendations for how to adapt to the emerging second phase of the administration’s foreign policy.  I’m not going to rehearse all of that detail here — if you’re interested in America’s public diplomacy and strategic communications, download the paper here from the CNAS website.   This report has been a long time in the making — I look forward to feedback and debate! 

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The Leveretts at RFI/ here

Two documents are driving the Iran-related news these days: the agreement announced Monday on refueling the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) brokered by Brazil and Turkey and the draft “Elements” of a potential new Iran sanctions resolution agreed by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and circulated yesterday to the Council’s 10 non-permanent members. Unfortunately, much of the media has misunderstood the relationship between these two documents.

Clearly, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton rushed to announce the text of the draft “elements” for a new sanctions resolution to push back against the Brazil-Turkey nuclear deal and show the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—before which she was committed to appear to discuss the new U.S.-Russia “START” agreement—that Washington was still “in control” of the Iranian nuclear issue. Her actions reflected considerable disregard, to say the least, for Brazilian and Turkish diplomatic efforts. As Tehran University professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi said, “The United States just slapped Turkey and Brazil in the face and spit on them afterwards”. (Mohammad went on to describe the United States as “throwing a tantrum”.)

Her actions may also have reflected a certain amount of dishonesty—we do not know what other word to use—on the Obama Administration’s part. In the wake of the Brazil-Turkey deal, the Administration is once again requiring Iran’s suspension of all activities related to uranium enrichment to avoid the imposition of new sanctions. As of Monday, the Administration’s position is that, even if Tehran carried out the steps specified in its agreement with Brazil and Turkey, new sanctions should be adopted unless Iran suspends enrichment activities.

But that had not been the Administration’s position since the Baradei proposal for refueling the TRR was first tabled in October. From that point until this Monday, the Administration repeatedly indicated that Iranian acceptance of the Baradei proposal would preclude the imposition of further sanctions, at least until there had been further negotiations about the broader range of issues associated with the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. At least in the near term, the avoidance of new sanctions was no longer linked to suspension. (Senior British officials told us last fall that this was why, as a matter of policy, Her Majesty’s Government did not want to see the TRR deal go through—because it would then be practically impossible to sanction Iran over its continued refusal to abide by Security Council resolutions calling for suspension.)

Now that Tehran has accepted the main elements of the Baradei proposal—the transfer of 1,200 kilos of low-enriched uranium out of Iran in exchange for new fuel for the TRR—the United States has unilaterally changed the game.

Most of the Western media bought into Secretary Clinton’s narrative before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday—that Washington has regained the diplomatic upper hand, and the P-5 are ready to go forward with new sanctions. We believe that the situation is much more complicated—and much riskier for the United States—than conventional wisdom currently allows. Getting P-5 agreement on a substantially watered-down and incomplete draft sanctions resolution (more on that below) is one thing. Getting P-5 agreement on scheduling that draft resolution for formal discussion and, ultimately, a vote in the Security Council is something else. Ensuring nine affirmative votes for the resolution—and avoiding deep divisions in the Council—is something else again.

Brazil and Turkey—both non-permanent members of the Security Council—are already indicating that they are not about to roll over in the face of Secretary Clinton’s bluster. Turkish Foreign Minister Davuto?lu says that Prime Minister Erdo?an will personally lobby his P-5 counterparts not to torpedo the Brazil-Turkey deal by prematurely passing a new sanctions resolution; Davuto?lu himself will work with the 10 non-permanent members. We expect that Brazil will also be intensively involved in efforts to slow the sanctions train. And, behind China’s statement of ongoing support for the two-track approach, Chinese sources are indicating that, while it may not be harmful to have the language of a new sanctions resolution ready to go in case the Brazil-Turkey deal falls apart, successful implementation of that deal could obviate the need for new sanctions.

With regard to a potential new sanctions resolution, the draft “elements” circulated to the full membership of the Security Council yesterday reflect—as we have been predicting for some time—major substantive concessions/surrenders by the Obama Administration.

–To win Russian and Chinese support, Washington had to give up on any idea of a ban on new investment or other measures that might have impeded Iran’s ability to produce and export hydrocarbons.

–The Administration had wanted a comprehensive embargo on arms sales to Iran, but had to settle for restrictions on transfers of a few specific categories of weapons systems.

–The Administration had wanted a comprehensive ban on financial dealings with the Revolutionary Guards and Revolutionary Guards-affiliated entities, but had to settle for the application of previously authorized asset freezes and travel restrictions to specified Revolutionary Guards elements, to be identified in one of the annexes to a new resolution. Tellingly, there is, at this point, no agreement among the Security Council’s permanent members regarding which Revolutionary Guards elements are to be included in the annex.

–Contrary to some media reports, the draft language would not authorize forcible boarding of Iranian vessels on the high seas.

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