AFP – Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon insisted on Saturday that he foresaw no crisis in Israel’s relations with Europe over the use of foreign passports in the murder of a Hamas commander as it had nothing to do with it.
A seemingly spontaneous Saudi-Israeli handshake at a European conference on security is mushrooming into what al-Quds al-Arabi calls an "unprecedented" public debate about the extent of official Arab-Israeli relations. The story isn’t especially interesting on its merits: Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon (most recently in the news for an ill-considered snub of the Turkish ambassador) seized the opportunity at a security conference in Munich the other day to maneuver former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal into an unprecedented public handshake.
While it might not seem like much, the picture of the handshake has rocketed through Arab politics and has become the focal point for an unusually blunt public discourse on the well-known reality of official Arab ties to Israel. The way the story is playing out is an object lesson in the power of publicity in Arab politics and in the limits of the much-mooted new "alliance" between Arabs and Israel against Iran. It shows both that many Arab leaders are indeed perfectly willing to work with the Israelis, but also that the political costs of this in the Arab sphere remain high — and that Israel’s policies towards Gaza and the Palestinians really do have a cost even if Arab leaders themselves don’t seem to much care.
For the Netanyahu government, the handshake was something of a coup. It allows Israel to claim that its diplomatic isolation is less than it appears, and that the costs of their polices towards Gaza and the Palestinians are less than believed. It offered a rare glimpse of the possibility of normalization with the Arabs at a time when a sense of siege prevails. It reinforces the popular Israeli and American narrative that the Arabs are moving towards alignment with Israel in the face of a common Iranian threat, and that the immobilized peace process does not stand in the way.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, it was deeply embarrassing to the Saudis for Prince Turki to be photographed publicly shaking hands with Israel’s Foreign Minister at a time when Israeli policies and its government are more loathed in the Arab world than ever. A succession of top Saudi officials, including King Abdullah, have repeatedly insisted that there would be no normalization or peace with Israel until it accepted a two-state solution along the lines of the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative. Prince Turki therefore put out a statement that Ayalon had been apologizing for
insulting the Kingdom, and that the handshake did not mean Saudi recognition of Israel (Ayalon tweeted that this was "as fanciful as Arabian Nights stories").
The Arab media (at least the non-Saudi owned Arab media) is having a field day. Many commentators are taking the opportunity to highlight the extent of official Saudi and Arab contacts with Israel, with Turki in particular identified as a "specialist" in meeting with Israelis at international conferences. Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar uses the "warm greeting" as a window into the long history of open and secret meetings between Arab officials and Israelis. I could give many, many more examples. Calling these meetings an "open secret" overstates their "secrecy"– such contacts have long been reported and discussed. The photograph has crystallized the issue for the moment, as fleeting as the moment is likely to be.
The handshake affair is worth a post because it both reinforces and undermines the emerging conventional wisdom in Washington that the Arab regimes and Israelis are increasingly allies against Iran. Such expectations of an Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran are hardly new. The Saudis and Egyptians were more or less openly aligned with Israel in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 (remember Condi Rice’s "birth pangs of the new Middle East"?), and to a lesser extent in the war on Gaza in 2008. Even in public, the "new Arab cold war" of the last few years has fairly openly and directly aligned the conservative Arab regimes with Israel against Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the "Resistance" bloc. Much of the official and Saudi-owned Arab media has for years been waging a heavy-handed campaign against the Resistance bloc, implicitly adopting many Israeli frames (Hamas and Hezbollah irrationality and irresponsibility, Arab moderation, Iranian threat).
But the Saudi pushback on the photo also shows the ongoing sensitivity of such relations, and the limits of the official media campaign in support of this supposed Arab-Israeli alignment. The images from Gaza and the ongoing impact of Netanyahu and Lieberman’s foreign policy has more than overwhelmed all the efforts to justify and legitimate such an approach to the broader Arab public. That anger is real, and quite potent in many Arab countries and in the wider Arab public sphere. The Saudis prefer to keep such relations private because of this very real outrage, and the real political costs of being on the wrong side in public.
It’s a common mistake to assume that only the private views of leaders or only public discourse matters. Both levels matter, the private Realpolitik of Arab leaders and the real passions of the Arab public. The depth of the gap between the private views of Arab leaders and the predominant views of the Arab public explains much of the vitriol of the current "Arab cold war". Many Arabs are worried about Iran, no doubt about it, and many in the official camp are deeply hostile to Hamas, Hezbollah, and most other forms of populist opposition. But most also continue to be genuinely outraged by Israeli policies and reject any public relationship. It’s a cliche to say so but also true: don’t expect the much-predicted Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran to ever live up to its hype (at least publicly) without real movement towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.
A seemingly spontaneous Saudi-Israeli handshake at a European conference on security is mushrooming into what al-Quds al-Arabi calls an "unprecedented" public debate about the extent of official Arab-Israeli relations. The story isn’t especially interesting on its merits: Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon (most recently in the news for an ill-considered snub of the Turkish ambassador) seized the opportunity at a security conference in Munich the other day to maneuver former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal into an unprecedented public handshake.
While it might not seem like much, the picture of the handshake has rocketed through Arab politics and has become the focal point for an unusually blunt public discourse on the well-known reality of official Arab ties to Israel. The way the story is playing out is an object lesson in the power of publicity in Arab politics and in the limits of the much-mooted new "alliance" between Arabs and Israel against Iran. It shows both that many Arab leaders are indeed perfectly willing to work with the Israelis, but also that the political costs of this in the Arab sphere remain high — and that Israel’s policies towards Gaza and the Palestinians really do have a cost even if Arab leaders themselves don’t seem to much care.
For the Netanyahu government, the handshake was something of a coup. It allows Israel to claim that its diplomatic isolation is less than it appears, and that the costs of their polices towards Gaza and the Palestinians are less than believed. It offered a rare glimpse of the possibility of normalization with the Arabs at a time when a sense of siege prevails. It reinforces the popular Israeli and American narrative that the Arabs are moving towards alignment with Israel in the face of a common Iranian threat, and that the immobilized peace process does not stand in the way.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, it was deeply embarrassing to the Saudis for Prince Turki to be photographed publicly shaking hands with Israel’s Foreign Minister at a time when Israeli policies and its government are more loathed in the Arab world than ever. A succession of top Saudi officials, including King Abdullah, have repeatedly insisted that there would be no normalization or peace with Israel until it accepted a two-state solution along the lines of the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative. Prince Turki therefore put out a statement that Ayalon had been apologizing for
insulting the Kingdom, and that the handshake did not mean Saudi recognition of Israel (Ayalon tweeted that this was "as fanciful as Arabian Nights stories").
The Arab media (at least the non-Saudi owned Arab media) is having a field day. Many commentators are taking the opportunity to highlight the extent of official Saudi and Arab contacts with Israel, with Turki in particular identified as a "specialist" in meeting with Israelis at international conferences. Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar uses the "warm greeting" as a window into the long history of open and secret meetings between Arab officials and Israelis. I could give many, many more examples. Calling these meetings an "open secret" overstates their "secrecy"– such contacts have long been reported and discussed. The photograph has crystallized the issue for the moment, as fleeting as the moment is likely to be.
The handshake affair is worth a post because it both reinforces and undermines the emerging conventional wisdom in Washington that the Arab regimes and Israelis are increasingly allies against Iran. Such expectations of an Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran are hardly new. The Saudis and Egyptians were more or less openly aligned with Israel in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 (remember Condi Rice’s "birth pangs of the new Middle East"?), and to a lesser extent in the war on Gaza in 2008. Even in public, the "new Arab cold war" of the last few years has fairly openly and directly aligned the conservative Arab regimes with Israel against Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the "Resistance" bloc. Much of the official and Saudi-owned Arab media has for years been waging a heavy-handed campaign against the Resistance bloc, implicitly adopting many Israeli frames (Hamas and Hezbollah irrationality and irresponsibility, Arab moderation, Iranian threat).
But the Saudi pushback on the photo also shows the ongoing sensitivity of such relations, and the limits of the official media campaign in support of this supposed Arab-Israeli alignment. The images from Gaza and the ongoing impact of Netanyahu and Lieberman’s foreign policy has more than overwhelmed all the efforts to justify and legitimate such an approach to the broader Arab public. That anger is real, and quite potent in many Arab countries and in the wider Arab public sphere. The Saudis prefer to keep such relations private because of this very real outrage, and the real political costs of being on the wrong side in public.
It’s a common mistake to assume that only the private views of leaders or only public discourse matters. Both levels matter, the private Realpolitik of Arab leaders and the real passions of the Arab public. The depth of the gap between the private views of Arab leaders and the predominant views of the Arab public explains much of the vitriol of the current "Arab cold war". Many Arabs are worried about Iran, no doubt about it, and many in the official camp are deeply hostile to Hamas, Hezbollah, and most other forms of populist opposition. But most also continue to be genuinely outraged by Israeli policies and reject any public relationship. It’s a cliche to say so but also true: don’t expect the much-predicted Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran to ever live up to its hype (at least publicly) without real movement towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.
AFP – Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon on Sunday denied apologising to a senior Saudi diplomat before a rare public handshake between officials of the two states.
Zvi Bar’el, in Haaretz, here
“Which Lebanon exactly does Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hold responsible for every Hezbollah action? Two months following the elections, Lebanon still has no government. The prime minister-designate, Sa’ad Hariri, just returned on Monday from a vacation in the south of France, the distribution of portfolios has yet to be completed and is likely to be delayed further due Walid Jumblatt’s decision to quit the majority bloc, and there does not appear to be anyone in Lebanon that is moved by the Israeli threats.
At the same time, it is clear to all parties in Lebanon that the Israeli threats to harm civilian infrastructure as retaliation for a Hezbollah attack have no basis since such reprisals will bear no influence on anyone within or without the Beirut government. The Lebanese public has already weighed in on its preference during the last elections in which Hezbollah was dealt a crushing blow (yet still wields considerable political leverage in the country).
Any Lebanese government would be compelled to stand behind Hezbollah in the event that civilian installations are attacked by Israel. The Syrian government, which has always been the address on which to assign responsibility, is behaving as if it is not involved in the domestic Lebanese arena to the point where it has even garnered praise from the U.S. and France. This time, Damascus can once again evade the brunt of responsibility.
Hezbollah, which has volley back Israeli threats, is also unmoved by statements uttered by Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon. Sources close to the organization have been quoted in Lebanese newspapers that they are certain Israel will not attack without approval from the American administration. In their view, Washington has no interest in any escalation that can derail Obama’s diplomatic plans and spoil the closer ties that are developing between the U.S. and Syria.
There is widespread agreement in Lebanon that an extraordinary set of circumstances whereby Hezbollah executes a massive, high-casualty terrorist attack would leave Israel little alternative but to attack. Yet, in the present situation in which Hezbollah is carefully calculating its political moves in Lebanon, the assessment holds that it will choose to refrain from such an adventure. Hezbollah is now in a comfortable position in which Israel’s threats bolster its arguments for continued armament as part of the Lebanese “defense alignment.” The Shi’ite militia views itself as a legitimate partner to the Lebanese army.
A different question arises from the link between the plot to target the Israeli ambassador in Egypt and Hezbollah. According to statements given to Egyptian authorities, the terror cell belongs to an extreme Islamist group which conspired to commit a series of attacks and robberies in Egypt. Their ideological goal was to rattle the existing order in Egypt to the point where the regime would fall. Yet, in contrast to Ayalon’s rush to link the terror cell with Hezbollah, the Egyptian reports make no connection between the two organizations”
In the WaPo, here
“….An Egyptian newspaper Saturday reported the capture of several men linked to al Qaeda — an exclusively Sunni Muslim group — intent on assassinating Israel’s ambassador to Cairo. But Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon said the alleged plot was “certainly” the work of Iranian-backed, Shi’ite Hezbollah.
“And I have one message here: If, God forbid, one hair falls off the head of any Israeli representative abroad, or of even an Israeli who is not an official representative, tourists, etc., we will consider Hezbollah responsible,” he told Israel Radio. ”The outcome, for Hezbollah, will, I think, be of the utmost gravity,” Ayalon said. “For Lebanon too.” ”It is important … to relay this warning to Lebanon, which is responsible for Hezbollah — that they will suffer the consequences if they carry out assassinations of Israelis.”……
Hezbollah had no comment on Ayalon’s remarks.
Asked how he could assert that it was Hezbollah who were behind the plot rather than al Qaeda, Ayalon told Israel Radio:”I don’t want to get into the intelligence or operational issues here, but certainly there is both an ideological connection and a professional connection of sorts here.”…..
Israel drove Hezbollah from its southern Lebanon strongholds in a 2006 war but has since complained that the militia has been secretly regrouping, despite a beefed-up U.N. peacekeeper force. Hezbollah has also boosted its political base in Beirut, and some analysts believe any threat it could pose to Israel would be as a retaliatory arm of Iran, should that country’s nuclear facilities come under pre-emptive Israeli strikes….”
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