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Posts Tagged ‘Egypt’

A Critique of Ahmad Nazif and a Mubarak Retrospective

March 19th, 2010 Arab News No comments

In the absence of a Vice President, Egyptian Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif has been Egypt’s acting President in the absence of Husni Mubarak in Germany. Here’s a piece in The National noting that Nazif is getting low marks for his leadership during the absence.

No surprise there. Under Egypt’s strong Presidential system (which gives the President roughly the powers exercised by, say, Ramses II, and the Prime Minister little authority at all), the Prime Minister is just the top bureaucrat/technocrat. The notion that, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, he can tell the Minister of Defense or Minister of the Interior what to do, would generate guffaws from most Egyptians, probably including Nazif himself. If critics are criticizing him for not saying enough about the death of the Sheikh al-Azhar, which is mentioned in the article, it’s doubtless because he hasn’t yet been told what he thinks on the matter. The next Sheikh al-Azhar will be chosen by Husni Mubarak or someone else in the senior elite, not Nazif.

While I’m on Egypt, though I’ve been cribbing a lot from The Arabist lately, he has posted a video essay on the Mubarak years which, while clearly partisan, has a lot of interesting historical video, and since he has posted embed codes, I’ll pass it on:


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Egypt prayers for Mubarak health

March 19th, 2010 Arab News No comments

Government-run mosques across Egypt offer prayers for President Hosni Mubarak’s recovery on Friday.
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For St. Patrick’s Day, An Oldie but a Goodie: the Ties Between the Irish and Coptic Traditions

March 17th, 2010 Arab News No comments

A year ago on Saint Patrick’s Day, I discoursed at some length about the hints and clues of ancient links between the early Irish church, including possibly Patrick himself, and the Coptic church of Egypt: the presence of Irish pilgrims in Egypt, of Coptic monks in Ulster, of liturgical and monastic similarities, etc.

Since the blog was less than two months old at the time a lot of my current readers probably weren’t following me yet, and most of you probably don’t have so much time on your hands as to have read the whole archive, I thought I’d refer you back to it. If you haven’t seen it before, enjoy; if you have, I haven’t much to add to it but I still think it’s little known (and not conclusive), but heck, it’s Saint Patrick’s Day and my name is Michael Collins Dunn. What can I say?

As I said back then, Misr Umm al-Dunya and Erin go Bragh.

Slainte to you all.


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Nathan Brown on the Mubarak Succession

March 17th, 2010 Arab News No comments

Nathan Brown, whose turf is constitutionalism in the Arab world and who’s the best at what he does, offers some comments at FP’s new Middle East Channel on “Who’s Running Egypt?” In the absence of Mubarak, it’s a good question. First, Nathan’s key points, then some comments of my own:

The article [in al-Shuruq] suggested that the country appears to be run by an absent president, a technocratic prime minister, a few leading politicians, and a collection of men behind a curtain.

This is new. For all its faults, Egypt’s political system generally makes clear who is in charge. The entire political order is carefully structured to have all lines of authority run to the president. As Mubarak has aged, however, his visible involvement in Egyptian politics has decreased, leading Egyptians to swap rumors about who is really running the country. Is it the security apparatus? His son? High members of the National Democratic Party? What is the role of his wife, a visible figure in Egyptian public life? Most important of all, who will follow him? Mubarak’s illness has catapulted these questions from the rumor mill to the headlines. But it has not answered them.

Aside from its overenthusiastic punctuation, the al-Shuruq article calmly reported that Husni Mubarak had deputized Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif to take on day-to-day presidential responsibilities. But Nazif is no Alexander Haig asserting that he is in control. If there is an Egyptian Haig, he is not in sight. The article made clear that Nazif’s authority is limited and that in important matters (such as those related to security) he consults with named and unnamed responsible authorities.

While there’s little in Nathan’s analysis I disagree with, I think I’d add a few things. I haven’t been to Egypt for a while but I think you already know I watch it closely. So some comments:

  • “the country appears to be run by an absent president, a technocratic prime minister, a few leading politicians, and a collection of men behind a curtain.” And of course, the military and security services, though that’s clear from some of the later comments. The men behind the curtain are the real story.
  • This is new. Sort of. There have been periods of uncertainty in the past, but no President has been this old before.

  • But Nazif is no Alexander Haig asserting that he is in control. If there is an Egyptian Haig, he is not in sight. No complaints on the “Nazif is no Alexander Haig” remark (younger and foreign readers: Haig was a Secretary of State who famously said “I’m in charge” when Ronald Reagan was shot, and died just recently). Nazif is just a technocrat. But “If there is an Egyptian Haig, he is not in sight” gives me more problems. Al Haig was sharp and ambitious and thought he had power, but I don’t think Haig at his best could exercise the sheer power of ‘Omar Suleiman.

  • As Mubarak has aged, however, his visible involvement in Egyptian politics has decreased, leading Egyptians to swap rumors about who is really running the country. Is it the security apparatus? His son? High members of the National Democratic Party? What is the role of his wife, a visible figure in Egyptian public life? Most important of all, who will follow him? Okay, my own take, purely subjective and probably incomplete, but let’s take it in order:Is it the security apparatus? Yes. His son? No, not yet, though he pretty much controls the party. High members of the National Democratic Party? Yes, Gamal among them but not supreme, and with the security services looking over their shoulders. What is the role of his wife? Well, she’s cast her lot with Gamal I suspect, and like Jihan al-Sadat has become a public figure in her own right, but also like Jihan, loses that job when her husband leaves the stage.

  • I know Nathan is writing for a non-specialized audience here, so this isn’t criticizing his statement, but I want to comment on this: The article made clear that Nazif’s authority is limited and that in important matters (such as those related to security) he consults with named and unnamed responsible authorities. Well, as he most surely knows, he has to. Nazif has no power base of his own, and Nathan didn’t need Al-Shuruq to tell him that. And the “unnamed responsible authorities”? Let’s see: the aforementioned ‘Omar Suleiman, head of the General Intelligence Service and, increasingly, Lord High Everything Else (thank you, Gilbert and Sullivan); Habib al-‘Adli, Minster of the Interior and fellow who controls most of the internal security apparatus; Field Marshal Tantawi, Defense Minister but definitely third in the triumvirate. Oh, and Gamal, the Party leadership, and others. Including Suzanne (Mme Mubarak).


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Anyone running this "inevitable but unworthy of respect" regime?

March 17th, 2010 Arab News No comments

FP/ here

“….the country appears to be run by an absent president, a technocratic prime minister, a few leading politicians, and a collection of men behind a curtain ……

The overall direction is clear: Egypt is now in the midst of an uneven political clampdown……..

….. The Egyptian Brotherhood is not going to transform itself into a revolutionary organization as a response: it is too set in its ways, cautious in its decision making, stodgy in its leadership, and committed to living down the damage to its reputation for past dalliances in the 1940s and 1950s with political violence. But its peaceful political efforts have few achievements to show (they have been able to sketch out a fairly comprehensive vision but not implement any of it). And the Brotherhood is increasingly dominated by leaders who prioritize politics less and show fewer political skills. Even one of the advocates and architects of its plunge into politics — ‘Abd al-Mun‘im Abu al-Futuh — recently floated the idea of a 20-year time out from parliament and national elections.

This is a loss — and not because the Brotherhood’s vision is so laudable. ……….The real loss, therefore, is not that the Brotherhood’s vision will not be realized. Instead it is to be found in the maintenance of a stultifying political environment. The Brotherhood’s leaders are the only opposition force in the country that can both articulate a vision and strategy and speak for a broad constituency. Without such Islamist participation, the Egyptian regime will be facing an opposition of inchoate protests and armchair intellectuals. This makes any positive political change unlikely. In fact, the more bashful Brotherhood will actually be useful to the regime — it does not threaten but it does serve as a bogeyman to scare liberals and Western governments……

…… But that is not the point. The ElBaradei phenomenon is still significant and should be alarming to the regime. This is not because he is a viable presidential candidate under Egypt’s closed system. Instead it is because only a regime without much credibility or legitimacy could be spooked by an international civil servant long absent from the country.

To say that Egypt is adrift is not to say its regime is unstable. Its current system does not inspire respect or affection, but it does quite effectively present itself as inevitable. It is as legitimate as gravity. In Egypt, the leadership’s sense of raison d’état remains robust indeed, the problem is that its raison d’être is evaporating.”

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IslamOnline staff protests curbs on 'editorial independence'

March 17th, 2010 Arab News No comments

The staff of Cairo-based IslamOnline website have gone on strike following a move by the site's management to restrict "editorial independence." he site was plunged into chaos after its bosses in Qatar decided to take control of its content from editorial offices in Egypt.
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The IslamOnline Affair

March 17th, 2010 Arab News No comments

Pic of IslamOnline strikers from Flickr user Ahmed Abd El-fatah

Over the last few days, Egyptian media circles have been up in arms about a strike at IslamOnline.net, the portal about Islam, Islamists and politics in the Muslim world. The chief meme being put out by employees and their supporters is that the “moderate” brand of Islam the site had promoted is being pushed out. A new board has come in at the Islamic Message Society of Qatar, which owns the site. Sheikh Youssef Qaradawi, the board chairman and founder, is said to be considering resigning. The new board wants to take the site in a more Salafist direction — for instance, board members objected to mentions of Valentine’s Day on the site. All of this info, of course, comes from the strikers so we have to take their word for it, the board is staying mum.

Now, I’ve always been irked at people describing Qaradawi as a moderate. But IslamOnline, which is not always necessarily so moderate, did put out an excellent media product and fascinating debates about Islamists, notably the Egyptian Muslim Brothers (I suspect that more than a few Brothers work at IslamOnline). I notably remember reading there the most trenchant critique of the Brothers’ political party program there, by a leading member of the group. It also has very wide discussion of social and personal problems from an Islamic perspective. Overall, while it wasn’t my proverbial cup of tea, it was possibly the most professional new media publication in Egypt, and certainly more “moderate” than Qatari wahhabis (they’re not much talked about, but are just as bad as their Saudi counterpart).

The strike thus far has featured a huge sit-in at the Sixth October City office of the site, which was broadcast live online, and vigils. And it’s very much the talk of the Egyptian Twittosphere.

There’s been some good reporting on this, here are a few links:

Islam On-Strike | Al-Masry Al-Youm: Today’s News from Egypt

Going Off-line | Al-Masry Al-Youm: Today’s News from Egypt

Daily News Egypt – Full Article (DNE: I thus punish you for not putting the headline of articles in the title of the page.) 



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Links for March 16 2010

March 16th, 2010 Arab News No comments



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Islam Online "on-strike" [update]

March 16th, 2010 Arab News No comments

Comprehensive coverage of this from Eman AbdElRahman, Global Voices Online, Egypt: IslamOnline Employees Strike, 16 Mar 2010 "It is worth mentioning that this strike may be the first instance in which strikers use new media efficiently and effectively to draw all the attention needed to support their cause, from continuous Twitter updates to Live streaming."

There’s a Facebook group: IslamOnline
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The Map: The Story of Palestinian Nationhood Thwarted After the League of Nations Recognized It

March 16th, 2010 Arab News No comments

On March 10, I posted on the humiliation heaped on Vice President Joe Biden by the Israeli government of far-right Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu. Biden went to Israel intending to help kick off indirect negotiations between Netanyahu and Palestine Authority president Mahmoud Abbas. Biden had no sooner arrived than the Israelis announced that they would build 1600 new households on Palestinian territory that they had unilaterally annexed to Jerusalem. Since expanding Israeli colonization of Palestinian land had been the sticking point causing Abbas to refuse to engage in negotiations, and, indeed, to threaten to resign, this step was sure to scuttle the very talks Biden had come to inaugurate. And it did.

The tiff between the US and Israel is less important that the worrisome growth of tension between Palestinians and Israelis as the Israelis have claimed more and more sites sacred to the Palestinians as well. There is talk of a third Intifada or Palestinian uprising.

As part of my original posting, I mirrored a map of modern Palestinian history that has the virtue of showing graphically what has happened to the Palestinians politically and territorially in the past century.

Andrew Sullivan then mirrored the map from my site, which set off a lot of thunder and noise among anti-Palestinian writers like Jeffrey Goldberg of the Atlantic, but shed very little light.

The map is useful and accurate. It begins by showing the British Mandate of Palestine as of the mid-1920s. The British conquered the Ottoman districts that came to be the Mandate during World War I (the Ottoman sultan threw in with Austria and Germany against Britain, France and Russia, mainly out of fear of Russia).

But because of the rise of the League of Nations and the influence of President Woodrow Wilson’s ideas about self-determination, Britain and France could not decently simply make their new, previously Ottoman territories into simple colonies. The League of Nations awarded them “Mandates.” Britain got Palestine, France got Syria (which it made into Syria and Lebanon), Britain got Iraq.

The League of Nations Covenant spelled out what a Class A Mandate (i.e. territory that had been Ottoman) was:

“Article 22. Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory [i.e., a Western power] until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.”

That is, the purpose of the later British Mandate of Palestine, of the French Mandate of Syria, of the British Mandate of Iraq, was to ‘render administrative advice and assistance” to these peoples in preparation for their becoming independent states, an achievement that they were recognized as not far from attaining. The Covenant was written before the actual Mandates were established, but Palestine was a Class A Mandate and so the language of the Covenant was applicable to it. The territory that formed the British Mandate of Iraq was the same territory that became independent Iraq, and the same could have been expected of the British Mandate of Palestine. (Even class B Mandates like Togo have become nation-states, but the poor Palestinians are just stateless prisoners in colonial cantons).

The first map thus shows what the League of Nations imagined would become the state of Palestine. The economist published an odd assertion that the Negev Desert was ‘empty’ and should not have been shown in the first map. But it wasn’t and isn’t empty; Palestinian Bedouin live there, and they and the desert were recognized by the League of Nations as belonging to the Mandate of Palestine, a state-in-training. The Mandate of Palestine also had a charge to allow for the establishment of a ‘homeland’ in Palestine for Jews (because of the 1917 Balfour Declaration), but nobody among League of Nations officialdom at that time imagined it would be a whole and competing territorial state. There was no prospect of more than a few tens of thousands of Jews settling in Palestine, as of the mid-1920s. (They are shown in white on the first map, refuting those who mysteriously complained that the maps alternated between showing sovereignty and showing population). As late as the 1939 British White Paper, British officials imagined that the Mandate would emerge as an independent Palestinian state within 10 years.

In 1851, there had been 327,000 Palestinians (yes, the word ‘Filistin’ was current then) and other non-Jews, and only 13,000 Jews. In 1925, after decades of determined Jewish immigration, there were a little over 100,000 Jews, and there were 765,000 mostly Palestinian non-Jews in the British Mandate of Palestine. For historical demography of this area, see Justin McCarthy’s painstaking calculations; it is not true, as sometimes is claimed, that we cannot know anything about population figures in this region. See also his journal article, reprinted at this site. The Palestinian population grew because of rapid population growth, not in-migration, which was minor. The common allegation that Jerusalem had a Jewish majority at some point in the 19th century is meaningless. Jerusalem was a small town in 1851, and many pious or indigent elderly Jews from Eastern Europe and elsewhere retired there because of charities that would support them. In 1851, Jews were only about 4% of the population of the territory that became the British Mandate of Palestine some 70 years later. And, there had been few adherents of Judaism, just a few thousand, from the time most Jews in Palestine adopted Christianity and Islam in the first millennium CE all the way until the 20th century. In the British Mandate of Palestine, the district of Jerusalem was largely Palestinian.

The rise of the Nazis in the 1930s impelled massive Jewish emigration to Palestine, so by 1940 there were over 400,000 Jews there amid over a million Palestinians.

The second map shows the United Nations partition plan of 1947, which awarded Jews (who only then owned about 6% of Palestinian land) a substantial state alongside a much reduced Palestine. Although apologists for the Zionist movement say that the Zionists accepted this partition plan and the Arabs rejected it, that is not entirely true. Zionist leader David Ben Gurion noted in his diary when Israel was established that when the US had been formed, no document set out its territorial extent, implying that the same was true of Israel. We know that Ben Gurion was an Israeli expansionist who fully intended to annex more land to Israel, and by 1956 he attempted to add the Sinai and would have liked southern Lebanon. So the Zionist “acceptance” of the UN partition plan did not mean very much beyond a happiness that their initial starting point was much better than their actual land ownership had given them any right to expect.

The third map shows the status quo after the Israeli-Palestinian civil war of 1947-1948. It is not true that the entire Arab League attacked the Jewish community in Palestine or later Israel on behalf of the Palestinians. As Avi Shlaim has shown, Jordan had made an understanding with the Zionist leadership that it would grab the West Bank, and its troops did not mount a campaign in the territory awarded to Israel by the UN. Egypt grabbed Gaza and then tried to grab the Negev Desert, with a few thousand badly trained and equipped troops, but was defeated by the nascent Israeli army. Few other Arab states sent any significant number of troops. The total number of troops on the Arab side actually on the ground was about equal to those of the Zionist forces, and the Zionists had more esprit de corps and better weaponry.

The final map shows the situation today, which springs from the Israeli occupation of Gaza and the West Bank in 1967 and then the decision of the Israelis to colonize the West Bank intensively (a process that is illegal in the law of war concerning occupied populations).

There is nothing inaccurate about the maps at all, historically. Goldberg maintained that the Palestinians’ ‘original sin’ was rejecting the 1947 UN partition plan. But since Ben Gurion and other expansionists went on to grab more territory later in history, it is not clear that the Palestinians could have avoided being occupied even if they had given away willingly so much of their country in 1947. The first original sin was the contradictory and feckless pledge by the British to sponsor Jewish immigration into their Mandate in Palestine, which they wickedly and fantastically promised would never inconvenience the Palestinians in any way. It was the same kind of original sin as the French policy of sponsoring a million colons in French Algeria, or the French attempt to create a Christian-dominated Lebanon where the Christians would be privileged by French policy. The second original sin was the refusal of the United States to allow Jews to immigrate in the 1930s and early 1940s, which forced them to go to Palestine to escape the monstrous, mass-murdering Nazis.

The map attracted so much ire and controversy not because it is inaccurate but because it clearly shows what has been done to the Palestinians, which the League of Nations had recognized as not far from achieving statehood in its Covenant. Their statehood and their territory has been taken from them, and they have been left stateless, without citizenship and therefore without basic civil and human rights. The map makes it easy to see this process. The map had to be stigmatized and made taboo. But even if that marginalization of an image could be accomplished, the squalid reality of Palestinian statelessness would remain, and the children of Gaza would still be being malnourished by the deliberate Israeli policy of blockading civilians. The map just points to a powerful reality; banishing the map does not change that reality.

Goldberg, according to Spencer Ackerman, says that he will stop replying to Andrew Sullivan, for which Ackerman is grateful, since, he implies, Goldberg is a propagandistic hack who loves to promote wars on flimsy pretenses. Matthew Yglesias also has some fun at Goldberg’s expense.

People like Goldberg never tell us what they expect to happen to the Palestinians in the near and medium future. They don’t seem to understand that the status quo is untenable. They are like militant ostriches, hiding their heads in the sand while lashing out with their hind talons at anyone who stares clear-eyed at the problem, characterizing us as bigots. As if that old calumny has any purchase for anyone who knows something serious about the actual views of Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu or Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, more bigoted persons than whom would be difficult to find. Indeed, some of Israel’s current problems with Brazil come out of Lieberman’s visit there last summer; I was in Rio then and remember the distaste with which the multi-cultural, multi-racial Brazilians viewed Lieberman, whom some openly called a racist.

End/ (Not Continued)

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