Iraq coalition talks ‘suspended’
Talks on forming a coalition government between Iraq’s two main political blocs are suspended, five months after an inconclusive election.
Go to Source
Talks on forming a coalition government between Iraq’s two main political blocs are suspended, five months after an inconclusive election.
Go to Source
Since last weekend or earlier there have been a number of reports about troubles between Egyptian security forces and bedouin in the Sinai. Now Interior Ministry officials have met with bedouin leaders to defuse the tensions, but it’s apparently not enough to satisfy the bedouin, who object to government crackdowns on what the government sees as smuggling and the tribes see as a heavy government hand.
I’ve held off on discussing this because the government-bedouin clashes occurred at the same time as (and perhaps related to) reports of an attempt to attack a gas pipeline to Israel, or perhaps a pipeline carrying gas to Jordan and Syria. The official version seems to be that someone set fire to vehicles near the pipeline, though other reports suggested it was actually blown up.
Relations with the Sinai bedouin have been rendered even touchier by the heavy Egyptian security effort to prevent terrorist infiltration aimed at attacking Israeli tourists visiting Egypt’s “Sinai riviera.”
If you’ve lost Rory Stewart, you’ve lost the war. Rory Stewart is a young British conservative, who once walked Afghanistan and later governed the Iraqi province of Maysan in 2003-2004 under Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Government. He is now a Tory Member of Parliament and a junior member of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in that body. Stewart ran a charity for years while residing in Kabul. He long expressed skepticism about a troop escalation in Afghanistan, but he is now in a position to influence British Prime Minister David Cameron. Stewart has vocally and publicly come out against the troop escalation or ‘surge’. And he wants a rapid reduction, though not complete withdrawal, beginning next summer (something that sounds to me sort of like the Biden/Eikenberry limited counter-terrorism strategy as opposed to McChrystal’s broad counter-insurgency campaign).
Stewart says, “I do not believe we can win a counterinsurgency campaign. We are never going to have the time or the troop numbers. Even if you put 600,000 troops on the ground, I can’t see a credible, effective, legitimate Afghan Government emerging . . . If you keep going like this the backlash that will build up, the spectres of Vietnam that will emerge in the minds of the British public will mean that we will end up leaving entirely and the country will be much worse off.”
He adds that after the draw-down of troops, “You would have a few planes around but you would no longer do counter-insurgency. You would no longer be in the game of trying to hold huge swathes of rural Afghanistan.”
Some 64% of the British public believes the Afghanistan war is frankly unwinnable, such that they are substantially more pessimistic than the American public (see below). And, almost as many Britons want their troops out of Afghanistan by the end of 2010 as think the war cannot be won.
Rory Stewart may be the single Western politician who knows Afghanistan best, and he is talking sense. if President Obama, Prime Minister Cameron, and Gen. Petraeus are looking for a voice of experience and someone who can see the forest, not just the trees, Stewart is their man. But to tell you the truth, I think anyone who knew anything serious about Afghanistan would say the same thing. The ‘counter-insurgency’ vision of US troops essentially conquering (“taking”) great tracts of Pashtun territory and even whole Pashtun cities such as Qandahar, and then pacifying them (clearing, holding, building) only has a 10 percent chance of succeeding. It is moreover risky, since it could create vast resentments among the divided Pashtuns and push more of them into opposition to the Karzai government and to the foreign troop presence.
The whole American public is moving in Stewart’s direction, after a period of relative optimism in which they gave incoming President Obama the benefit of the doubt with regard to his insistence that he could turn Afghanistan around. Americans are returning to the pessimistic mood on the war that they were in during the last years of the Bush administration. In a new Rasmussen opinion poll, nearly 60% of likely American voters say either that the US cannot win in Afghanistan or that they are not sure it can (but only 36% say flatly that the US cannot win). Nearly half say it is more important to end the war than to win it.
This Rasmussen poll shows a mood even more pessimistic than another recent sounding by ABC & the Washington Post, which found that 53% of Americans think the war is not worth its cost.
Nearly half in the Rasmussen poll also say that they think Afghanistan is very important to US security and over 80% think it is at least somewhat important. It is hard to understand how the fifth poorest country in the world, a virtual failed state, can pose a security threat to the United States. I presume this sentiment is the long arm of the September 11 attacks, though that operation was carried out by a small transnational terrorist group consisting of non-Afghans, not by the country of Afghanistan.
As usual, party politics skews these results. Rasmussen says that over two-thirds of Democrats think President Obama is doing a good job with his Afghanistan policy, whereas only 15% of Republicans agree.
This ‘two-party epistemology’ in the US (as I called it early in the Iraq War) produces odd outcomes, such as that 60% of Republicans think it is more important to win the war than to end it, but they don’t like Obama’s efforts to do just that. Whereas most Democrats want out, the opposite of Obama’s policy of escalation–but a super-majority of Democrats thinks Obama is doing a dandy job in running the war. This odd set of contradictory attitudes is what allows the war to marching vigorously on. Democrats do not wish to undermine their own president, who is committed to prosecuting the war, and while Republicans don’t like Obama, they support the war effort.
Some 15% of respondents admitted that they aren’t following the war, while 41% say they are following it very closely. But 83% claim to be following the news about the Afghanistan war at least somewhat closely. This set of responses proves again that people tell pollsters what they they think they ought to be doing, rather than what they do do. Afghanistan news is almost never in the top 15 “favorite” news stories at google.news or Blogpulse or at CNN, and often doesn’t even make “world news” at google. The McChrystal saga was an exception, because it was in a way a domestic story. But about this issue, the respondents are just lying. Few are actually paying attention.
For another take on the Rasmussen poll, the CSM.
UPDATE 1: US government adds more Iranian individuals and firms to a long blacklist under extended sanctions.
Go to Source
Ahmed Shaaban, khaleejtimes.com, Government blogging still short of systematisation, 10 June 2010
"The Arab countries, particularly the UAE and Bahrain, have presented leading examples of government blogging, yet all still lack systematisation, according to senior official here.
"“The Bahraini e-government has created a blog where it more effectively interacted with the public and led to an
Go to Source
“……. Despite a heightened awareness of terrorism and terrorist groups since 9/11, American policy toward Lebanon, Syria and Hezbollah remains confused–a mass of mixed signals and inconsistent approaches. Despite more than $1.6 billion in economic and military assistance to Lebanon since FY06 (including requests for FY2011), despite a concerted effort to reach out to the Assad regime in Damascus, and despite a willingness to overlook the increasingly dominant military and political role played by Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Obama administration has little to show for its efforts in the Levant.
In the wake of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005–a murder in which Hezbollah was reportedly involved–the international community took a relatively hard line against Syria and its proxies. The resulting end to the Syrian military domination of Lebanon gave many of us hope that Lebanon was at last on track to regain the independence lost in 1976. Certainly, it seemed that Washington, at least, would no longer tolerate the exploitation of the Lebanese people by both Tehran and Damascus.
“this is ‘included’…”
In the years that followed, there were troublesome developments that should only have fueled our commitment to helping Lebanon protect itself from Syrian and Iranian predations. In 2006, Hezbollah crossed Lebanon’s southern border with Israel and kidnapped two Israeli soldiers, sparking a war between Israel and Hezbollah that resulted in substantial loss of life, including Lebanese civilians. How was it possible that one armed group could, without consultation or compunction, drag a nominally democratic nation into war? Worse still, Hezbollah’s performance in that conflict revealed that what some in Israel and the U.S. had dismissed as a ragtag group of terrorists was a sophisticated, well trained and very well armed fighting machine.
The subsequent passage of U.N. Security Council resolution 1701 and its call for “no weapons without the consent of the Government of Lebanon and no authority other than that of the Government of Lebanon” appeared….. all but ignored in the face of repeated and flagrant violations.
And there were more frightening signs: revelations that Syria was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability; … assassinations of anti-Syrian politicians in Lebanon; the collapse of the March 14 movement; Hezbollah’s 2008 armed take-over of Beirut, and the subsequent capitulation of March 14 to Hezbollah’s demands for a veto over government decisions.
During this political turmoil, Iran and Syria continued to rearm Hezbollah. Transfers, which were slow in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 war, ramped up quickly, and Hezbollah is now significantly better armed than it was in 2006. According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, “Syria and Iran are providing Hezbollah with rockets and missiles of ever-increasing capability [and] we’re at a point now, where Hezbollah has far more rockets and missiles than most government in the world.” Consider the developments reported on AEI’s Iran Tracker site from the last six months alone (citations and sources can be found on the site):
The Times of London (suckles from the likes of Pletka!) reports that Israeli and American officials believe Syria transferred two Scud missiles into Lebanon, …… According to the report, satellite imagery shows one of the secret arms facilities in Adra, Syria, where Hezbollah militants have living facilities and trucks to transport the missiles to Lebanon.)
Hezbollah sources told the Kuwaiti paper al Rai (sometimes suckles from the likes of Pletka!) that the group had the capability to launch 15 tons of explosives at Israel every day….
The Israeli Foreign Minister (no need for introduction!) said that the arms seized from a cargo plane in Bangkok in December 2009 were destined for Hezbollah and Hamas. …..originated in North Korea, was carrying 35 tons of weaponry including rockets and RPGs.
In January, a busy month, the Washington Post (Hiatt & co. suckles from the ‘fountain of Zionist Evil’)reported that Hezbollah placed long-range rockets deep into Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley; Hezbollah terrorists fired an anti-tank rocket at an IDF bulldozer that was clearing a minefield along the Israeli-Lebanese border, killing a soldier; and the Israeli navy seized an Iranian ship en route to Syria carrying weapons destined for Hezbollah from Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez; the Kuwaiti papers reported a U.S. official saying that Hezbollah operatives trained in Syria on SA2 anti-aircraft missile batteries; and finally UN peacekeepers uncovered 660 pounds of explosive devices near the border with Israel (this happened in December, but was reported in January)…….
In short, Hezbollah is effectively a state within a state in Lebanon, with an ever growing and ever more sophisticated long range arsenal. It is untrammeled by the Lebanese government to which it belongs and answerable to no one in that nation, but rather to the dictatorships in Damascus and Tehran. Sadly, hopes that Lebanese leaders answerable to the Lebanese people–and not to foreign powers–would regain control have not been realized. There is no more poignant symbol of that failure than the fact that as Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri was meeting with our own President Obama and his team, Lebanese President Michel Suleiman appeared on Hezbollah’s television station, al Manar, praising Hezbollah and “calling on all Lebanese to embrace and protect [Hezbollah's] arms.”
….. In short, Hezbollah is capable of waging war on its own behalf, …… What this means for Lebanon is the continued erosion of the state, its subjugation to foreign interests, a loss of independent will and democracy and a potent threat to American allies and American interests. In the years since the Hezbollah-Israel war, the United States has pursued a policy aimed at bolstering the Lebanese state at the expense of Hezbollah….. If we hoped it would buy independence from Syria or Iran or an end to terrorist training camps–camps whose teachings have resulted in the death of American soldiers–we were wrong.
Rumors abound lately that the Obama administration is considering the wisdom of reaching out directly to Hezbollah to establish a dialogue. Recently, John Brennan, the White House’s top counter-terrorism official, suggested the United States needed to find a way to “build up the more moderate elements” within Hezbollah, which he termed “a very interesting organization”. His statements stand in stark contrast to those of other administration officials, including former DNI Denny Blair, who earlier this year refused to rule out a possible Hezbollah attack on the United States….
The time has come to reassess our relationship with Lebanon and the challenge posed by Hezbollah. I do not believe we will be served by greater rapprochement with Damascus or with their terrorist proxies.
Finally, at a certain moment it will be necessary for us to ask whether U.S. taxpayer dollars going to Lebanon are helping our friends, or subsidizing our enemies. If the support to Lebanon’s army is not going to secure Lebanon’s borders, and it’s not going to rid Lebanon of terrorist groups, one might reasonably ask what it is going for. That’s a question Congress has asked in years past, when Lebanon was a center of kidnapping, hijacking and murder. Thanks to Hezbollah, it is time to ask again.”

Just as Iran has emerged as a more significant regional power after the Iraq war of 2003, Turkey in the past two years has emerged as a more dynamic, respected and powerful regional player, and the events of the past week off the Gaza coast have only accelerated this process. The third non-Arab power in the Middle East – Israel – seems to be moving in the opposite direction, generating increasingly vocal international criticisms and demands for investigations into its behavior, while many of its leaders are cancelling trips abroad for fear of being indicted for war crimes.
Of these three countries, Turkey strikes me as the most interesting and important, because its growing prominence includes a combination of respect, credibility and democratic legitimacy that Iran and Israel do not fully share. Much international media and political analysis speaks incorrectly of Turkey and Iran as either hegemons or role models for the rest of the Middle East. They are neither, because non-Arab states, even Muslim-majority ones, cannot expect to define how power is exercised, relations configured, interests determined, or identity expressed in the Arab world.
Turkey, though, now enjoys greater respect and appreciation around the region, because it approaches most closely that cherished goal that has eluded every Arab country and Iran since the age of independence dawned nearly a century ago: genuine nationalism, combined with democratic governance and Islamic values, in a context of clear modernity and secularism. Turkey is Hittites with iPods – a strong national identity anchored in ancient traditions in the land, yet combined with modern values and behavior that accentuate its power, efficacy and impact on others in the neighborhood.
The Israeli attack last Monday on a Turkish ship in the humanitarian aid convoy heading for Gaza, which resulted in the killing of eight Turks and one Turkish American, heightened the strains between Israel and Turkey that had been building during the past year – largely due to Turkey’s disapproval of Israel’s war and then siege of Gaza. Turkey criticized Israel’s policies toward the Palestinians while also mediating seriously between Israel and Syria. In other words, it conducted a mature, nuanced foreign policy that avoided simplistic, black-and-white, “you’re with us or against us” attitudes. Rather, it patiently maneuvered itself into situations where it could serve its own national interests while also playing a constructive role in the region.
The latest example of this was the recent Turkish-Brazilian mediation with Iran over the latter’s nuclear industry…..
Turkey has also operated regionally in a manner that seeks to protect its own legitimate national strategic interests, without appearing to be aggressive or predatory to its neighbors. This is significant because of the historical mixed feelings in the Arab world about the four centuries of Ottoman control of key parts of this region. A remarkable feat of the current Justice and Development Party that rules Turkey has been its successful repositioning of Turkey among its skeptical and suspicious Arab neighbors. As my colleague and friend Tarek Yousef, the dean of the Dubai School of Government, noted the other day: “[T]his government in Turkey in the past three years has erased hundreds of years of Arab suspicion of the Turks, an amazing achievement that should not be overlooked.”
Turkey’s strong and repeated public criticism of Israeli policies reached a new peak after this week’s Israeli attack against Turkish ships and nationals in international waters. Turkey’s government will now enjoy greater respect and accolades from Arab public opinion, but like the stronger Iran of recent years it will not be able to translate this heightened appreciation into any kind of greater direct impact on the region – which is not one of its stated goals, in any case.
Many international analysts or commentators are wrongly looking to Iran and Turkey as potential new hegemons or role models in the Arab-majority Middle East region, but these are the wrong attributes or roles to look for. No Arab country shows the inclination to adopt Turkish-style secular, republican and democratic constitutionalism, or the ability to adopt Iranian-style technological prowess and political defiance of the West.
Turkey and Iran, in their different ways, are noteworthy because they practice genuinely sovereign decision- and policymaking – something that eludes, but should entice, the Arab world.
The Iraqi government says it plans to close the state-owned Iraqi Airways after declaring it bankrupt.
Go to Source
Reuters – Australia’s government said on Monday it had ordered the expulsion of an Israeli diplomat over the use of fake passports in the assassination of a top Hamas militant in Dubai in January.
Go to Source
Guerrillas fired mortar shells and used small arms to attack the major US military base in south Afghanistan, Qandahar Airfield, on Saturday. The operation was the third major attack by insurgents during the past week. They had also attacked a NATO convoy in the capital, Kabul, and had attacked Bagram Base north of Kabul. The seven hours long assault on Bagram was a by a company-sized unit of some 30 armed men, who managed to kill a contractor and wound 9 US or NATO troops, while all 16 of them were killed in heavy fighting. The attacks have pushed the death toll for US troops in Afghanistan past the 1000 mark.
The bold attacks come as President Barack Obama addressed West Point cadets, declaring victory in Iraq and predicting a similar positive outcome in Afghanistan. Obama alleged that the US was withdrawing from a now-democratic Iraq that would not be a platform for attacking the US, implying that Afghanistan would be brought to a similar end-state. But Iraq is highly unstable, has not formed a new government more than two months after the March 7 elections, and cannot exactly be called either democratic or secure and stable. If Iraq is Obama’s measure of success in Afghanistan, he has very low expectations.
At the same time, US and NATO troops began a sweep of a Qandahar neighborhood. The 200 US troops and about 200 – 250 Afghanistan National Army troops conducted door to door searches. The operation is seen as a dry run for a huge push on Qandahar by NATO this summer. This province is, along with Helmand, a major center of poppies-grown for opium and ideologically tends to support or at least think well of the old Taliban of Mulla Omar. Karen DeYoung of WaPo reports on the doubts even in the Pentagon that a ‘clearing campaign’ targeting Taliban in Qandahar can succeed.
Meanwhile, a long-running feud between the lower house of parliament and the Karzai government came to a boil on Saturday as the MPs went on strike, according to Pajhwok News Agency. President Karzai had missed the deadline for presenting to parliament his nominations for the 11 remaining cabinet posts in his government. In reaction, the lower house went on strike.
Pajhwok writes, “Chairman Muhammad Younus Qanuni said no session of any commission would be held until the ministers were introduced. An MP from the western Badghis province, Azita Rafat, said the delay in introducing the remaining cabinet members had worsened relations between parliament and the government. “The government neither respects the votes of the nation nor us,” she said.”
Speaker Yunus Qanuni is a Tajik former member of the Northern Alliance and is close to Abdullah Abdullah, Karzai’s main rival in last summer’s presidential election. Since Abdullah’s supporters generally believe that Karzai stole the election, it is now difficult for him to achieve better relations with parliament. That any resolution of the crisis in Afghanistan will ultimately have to be political in character is widely recognized. But how to get a political settlement when the executive and the legislature are themselves at daggers drawn is not clear.
Aljazeera English reports on the Taliban and US/NATO campaigns this week in Afghanistan:
Reader Reactions