Arab News Blog

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Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak cancels plans to attend a summit in Uganda, amid fresh speculation over his health.
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Egypt Wednesday denied recent reports about the deterioration of President Hosni Mubarak's health.
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E.T. Come HomeI have been largely offline recently because of recent travels, as we settle into Morocco for the summer. While the Arab Far West provides a much gentler climate than Cairo, as every summer I worry that Hosni Mubarak will take advantage of my absence to step down, kick the bucket or somesuch. Having spent the past 10 years of my life waiting for that moment, I don’t want to miss out (a rather sad realization, I know.)

The recent rumors about Mubarak’s ill-health — that his recent trip to Paris was for a check-up (Mubarak used to get discreetly treated by La Republique Française at the military hospital at Saint-Cyr), or that he might imminently visit his German doctors (who have been quietly visiting him in Cairo and Sharm al-Sheikh for months) — are practically unverifiable, of course. Rather than speculate on their authenticity, we might reflect on the fact that Egyptian authorities thought it fit to deny them. Which, of course, can only heighten the speculation in Arab countries, where regimes usually only issue false information and denials are interpreted as early confirmations (there is a fascinating treatise to be written about information flows and interpretation in dictatorships.)

Or that this will pretty be par for the course in the months and years ahead. Assuming, as I am, that Mubarak is seriously ill but has some time left (or indeed may recover) he will be constantly subjected to this kind of rumor-mongering. Canceling a meeting with Netanyahu? Must be rushing off to Germany. Visiting Europe? Must be to visit a nearby clinic. Attending a military parade? It all smacks of trying too hard. These are facile conclusions that hide a nearly total information vacuum. Yes, you can look at the picture above and conclude that Hosni Mubarak is not feeling too well. But does it tell you, as one diplomat told the World Tribune, that he is a living corpse? 

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"So the Arab core grows hollow," laments former Bush administration Middle East adviser Elliott Abrams in the Weekly Standard today. Most of the essay is an unexceptional restatement of neo-conservative tropes: Obama is weak, Arabs only respect power, Turkey has become a radical Islamist enemy… you can fill in the rest of the blanks. But the lament about the hollowness of the Arab core deserves more careful attention. Why has the Arab core grown so hollow? After all, the Arab core — in his definition, mostly Egypt and Saudi Arabia — has been closely aligned with the United States for many decades, and its leaders cooperated very closely with the Bush administration on virtually every issue. This points to a contradiction at the core of the approach favored by Abrams. The cooperation by these Arab leaders, in the face of widespread and deep hostility towards those policies among much of the Arab public, contributed immensely towards stripping away their legitimacy and driving them towards ever greater repression. The approach outlined so ably by Abrams isn’t the solution to the problem of this "hollow Arab core." It is one of its causes. And the problem with Obama administration’s regional diplomacy thus far has been that it has changed too little.. not too much.

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To explain the feebleness of the Arab core compared to Turkey and Iran, Abrams focuses primarily on the advancing age of Hosni Mubarak and Saud al-Faisal. Twenty years ago, he argues, these were men to be feared. But now they are unable to muster the same persuasive powers and have no obvious replacements. As a result of their dwindling powers, he suggests, Qatar’s relatively young Foreign Minister and "clever, unprincipled, energetic actors" such as Turkey’s Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign Minister Davutoglu can drive the agenda. This is an oddly personalized view of diplomacy. Qatar’s diplomacy may be clever, but its ability to deploy its staggering wealth probably makes others inclined to appreciate its cleverness. Turkish leaders may be clever and energetic, but they also command a country with a powerful military and robust economy, membership in NATO, and real and growing soft power appeal across the region.

The advancing age of a few individuals is not on its own a satisfying explanation for the declining influence of Arab leaders. States like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have lost influence not only because of their leaders’ advancing age, but also because of the deep unpopularity of many of the policies they have been led to defend by the United States. A more vigorous Hosni Mubarak would not make Egypt’s role in enforcing the blockade of Gaza more attractive to most Arabs. Abrams, who has long been a vocal advocate of democracy promotion in the
Middle East, would likely agree that the stultifying repression in
these countries has impeded the emergence of new leaders. But he, like many neoconservative advocates of democracy promotion, rarely addresses head on the reality that the policies pursued by these friendly autocrats in support of U.S. policy objectives contribute deeply to the unpopularity of those regimes. The Arab core has been hollowed out in large part because of, not in spite of, its role in American foreign policy.

The Bush administration sought to polarize the Middle East into an axis of "moderates" — grouping Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and other like-minded Sunni autocrats with Israel — against "radicals" such as Iran, Syria, Hezbollah and Hamas. The Arab leaders on which the U.S. relied mostly went along, cooperating to a considerable degree in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and siding against Hezbollah in the 2006 Israeli war with Lebanon and against Hamas during the 2008 Israeli attack on Gaza. But Arab public opinion was largely on the other side, with broad majorities of the population in most of those Arab countries angrily denouncing both the Israeli wars and their own leaders for the positions they took in line with American preferences. To contain this popular anger and to continue to help American policies (such as Egypt’s enforcing the blockade of Gaza), those Arab regimes became increasingly repressive. It is not an accident that after all the Bush administration’s rhetoric about democracy promotion, it almost completely abandoned such efforts by early 2006 after the electoral victory by Hamas, and its legacy was a Middle East considerably less democratic than when it took office.

It is also not an accident that the two most vital, energetic forces in the region today, Qatar and Turkey, are the two countries which have tried the hardest to break away from the Bush administration’s polarized world view. Each attempted to play the role of a bridge across the regional divides, maintaining ties with both sides in order to depolarize regional politics. Both are close American allies with strong military ties and both have had good relations with Israel in the past. At the same time, both maintain good relations with actors in the so-called "radical" camp and have made major efforts to reach out to Arab public opinion rather than to try to silence or repress it. As relatively new actors on the scene, they have been palpably impatient with a moribund old order and unconcerned with finding a way to fit in with the entrenched, calcified lines of conflict in the region.

The failure of the Obama administration thus far is not that it has been insufficiently aggressive, a "fierce and certain ally [which] gives moderates strength and
radicals pause." It is that it has not changed enough. It has too often remained locked in the Bush administration’s framework of moderates and radicals, and has failed to truly take advantage of the opportunities offered by these energetic new "bridge" actors such as Turkey and Qatar. The growing Arab disenchantment with Obama is rooted in the widespread belief that American policies have not changed very much from the Bush years despite the improved rhetoric.

When Obama came to office promising a new beginning and a move away from the polarizing rhetoric of his predecessor, Turkey and Qatar offered an intriguing model for engagement across both sides of the divide. They could have been valuable interlocutors for the United States in pursuing a grand bargain with Iran based on common interests across the region or for exploring peace opportunities between Israel and Syria (as the Turks had already been trying to accomplish, with some success). The U.S. might have sought their help in brokering an intra-Palestinian reconciliation and reunifying the West Bank and Gaza.

But for the most part, the Obama administration chose to fall back on the conventional policies of the past: Palestinian reconciliation remained in the hands of an enfeebled and partisan Egypt, the grand bargain with Iran faded from an agenda dominated by the nuclear question and sanctions, and the Turks are now seen as more of a problem than an asset. Breaking through some of these intractable problems will require not going back to the failed approach of the Bush administration, but rather rediscovering the genuine conceptual changes which Obama originally brought to the table.

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As Israel calls Mubarak a “strategic treasure” … Indeed … FP/ here

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Today the New York Times pointed out that Hosni Mubarak turned 82 yesterday, and is still bunkered in Sharm al-Sheikh where he is recovering from his operation and receiving foreign dignitaries.

The president’s continued convalescence far from the capital underscored the frailty not just of the man but of a nation with no clear political plan for who will govern should he die or step down, political scientists here said.

The president has been back to work, meeting with foreign leaders and even giving a national address on Sinai Liberation Day. But he did not give his annual Labor Day speech last week, and has not yet returned to Cairo, where protests rage daily about low wages. He continues to look relatively frail and his health remains the focus of intense speculation.

“The issue is not about his health today,” said Wahid Abdel Meguid, deputy director of the state-financed Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies. “It is about the ambiguity of the future with regards to the transfer of power, be it in the near or far future. There is increasing anxiety, which used to be prevalent among limited circles of intellectuals and elites, but now it has spread throughout society.”

To address that concern, the state-owned newspaper Al Ahram ran a front page paean to Mr. Mubarak on Tuesday that not only flattered, but also offered an indication of what the public should expect. The headline beneath a picture of Mr. Mubarak said, “The Maker of the Future.”

“We shall not forget to say to him ‘happy birthday’ on this grand day that is dear to our souls,” wrote the newspaper’s chief editor, Osama Saraya. “We say it to him and our hearts flutter with happiness for his recovery after a therapeutic trip after which he returned to arduous work inside and outside to protect Egypt’s ability and place and pivotal role in the interest of all Arab brothers to prevent wars and resume peace for the sake of building nations.”

I think this fairly summarizes the issues at stake — the uncertainty over succession, the expectation that he won’t step down soon (or ever) but that we are nearing the end of the Mubarak era, as well as the anxiety of state newspaper editors and others over the coming year or two. Hosni Mubarak, as I’ve briefly hinted before, is almost certainly seriously ill. It may be complications from the stroke he allegedly suffered from after the death of his grandson, when he disappeared from public view for a month. A recent post by the highly perceptive Zeinobia yesterday, showing partial paralysis of his left hand, would lend credence to the stroke theory. Here are the pics Zeinobia put up:

The lack of movement and position of the left hand is certainly striking.

Since the operation in Germany, however, the rumor mill in Cairo has largely focused on whether Mubarak may have cancer, and that his operation was to remove a tumor. According to the most elaborate and plausible version I’ve heard, Mubarak does indeed has cancer, but not of the pancreas as many have speculated. It’s a nearby area that was affected. He had been treated in Egypt for a while for this, but the German medical team decided it would be best to conduct the operation in Germany, with its own tools. This scenario would give him 12-18 months to live, conveniently close to the deadline for the next presidential elections. If it had been pancreatic cancer, a particularly nasty form of the disease, the prognostic would be six months.

To me, the issue is not so much as to what Mubarak suffers from exactly (the rumors may be wrong, although tellingly some high-level foreign sources agree with the above analysis), but rather that it raises question about who rules Egypt today, as well as who has governed for the last few years of diminishing health. It’s known among diplomatic circles in Cairo that Mubarak has been taking fewer meetings, leaning more and more on his chief aide Suleiman Awad as an aide-memoire in the last few years. It’s been generally acknowledged that foreign policy, the one area where Mubarak is most active, is today largely in the hands of Omar Suleiman, and most domestic policies in the hands of the cabinet and Gamal Mubarak. The fragmentation of power in recent years is now common wisdom because the recent operation made it obvious; the question raised is how long has this been the case?

There are other factors that suggest that the operation may have precipitated either a conflict within these centers of power, or that the lack of an effective president to be final arbiter is having an effect. In recent months we’ve seen a backlash on the economic ministers and, implicitly, Gamal Mubarak coming from presidential chief of staff Zakariya Azmi and other regime grandees. We’ve seen that the Gang of Six, the senior members of the NDP who appear to have key decision-making power, are an important but not necessarily united force. We’ve heard continuous rumors about Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif being replaced, although that may have been because the last time Mubarak was operated he dismissed Nazif’s predecessor, Atef Ebeid, three days after he returned to business (and that signaled a major change in economic policy).

The research firm Stratfor, in one of its largely unsubstantiated missives, recently wrote about the rumors that Nazif will go and that a vice-president will finally be appointed, after 29 years of Mubarak refusing to do so:

Upon his return to Cairo, Mubarak is expected to announce his replacement for the premiership, as well as his choice for vice president. According to the STRATFOR source, Mubarak is selecting from three individuals for the prime minister’s post. The first is Omar Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief and long-rumored successor to Mubarak. The second is Zakaria Azmi, a prominent member of the People’s Assembly and close friend of Mubarak. The third is Lt. Gen. Ahmad Shafiq, Egypt’s minister of Civil Aviation and former commander of the Egyptian air force.

It’s interesting that Ahmed Shafiq’s name is increasingly mentioned, as is Azmi’s, and that these elder statesmen of Mubarakism are expected to be one-term presidents before Gamal Mubarak is elected. Maybe Stratfor knows something I don’t, but the idea of a puppet strongman being the midwife to Gamal seems ridiculous to me. What possible incentive could he have after he becomes president? 

I don’t know who Stratfor’s source is, but I doubt it’s better informed than a guest at some of Heliopolis’ finest tables. But the question of to what extent is succession being planned by Mubarak (never mind Gamal’s pretty obvious ambition) and to what extent there is overt competition to replace him is one of the most important in Egypt today. Competition inside the regime is perhaps one of the most dangerous outcomes of the lack of a clear, generally accepted, successor — especially as factions would be tempted to manipulate pockets of the public that are eager for change. Egypt has seen such populist manipulations many times before, and the recent attacks on the “economic reformists” are unusual (after all it’s not like their policies weren’t endorsed by Mubarak or like anyone opposed them publicly before). Unfortunately, this now appears more likely that any kind of reasonably democratic transition, since there has been very little done to prepare for that. 

So the outlook for Egypt in the next two years isn’t great: unless there’s a dramatic change like the appointment of a vice-president, Mubarak is likely to run again and stay in power until he dies or, now marginally more likely, step down but only at the last moment possible. In the meantime, tension is growing — not only between the regime and its opponents, but also within the regime itself. Nature abhors a vacuum, and while Egypt does not yet have a vacuum of authority, security, or governance, it does have a vacuum of information.

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AFP – Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas held consultations on Wednesday with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak days before the expected resumption of Palestinian-Israeli indirect peace talks.

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Umm Kulthoum makes an appearance in the logo, at least on www.google.com.eg. Why today? Some say it’s her birthday (4 May 1900 to be exact, although no one knows for sure.) If that’s the case, she shares it with another important Egyptian: Hosni Mubarak. Happy 82nd, ya rayiss.

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I suppose I owe a serious blog post after the previous not so serious one. I intend to return to the succession issue in Egypt shortly, but before that wanted to note that the Muslim Brothers have recently announced they will participate in the upcoming Shura Council elections by fielding 15 candidates.

In the last Shura Council elections, none of their candidates were allowed to run, though many tried. Now, they intend to have current MPs try to run for the upper house, hoping that they will benefit from parliamentary immunity during their campaign. Of course that immunity won’t be extended to their campaign staff, but they are used to that. It’s interesting to see this sign, however minor, of a willingness to continue the project to broaden the Brothers’ electoral participation launched in 2005/06 by the former guide, Mahdi Akef. They almost certainly won’t get elected, but they are putting a marker out there saying “we are entitled to contest it, and won’t stop trying.”

In other words, this suggest that they consider the last few years of intense repression a temporary setback, and still have in mind the post-(Hosni) Mubarak endgame of either formalizing their political role or ensuring their growth on the political scene. Food for thought after months of Brotherhood-regime negotiations about succession and the elections: even if these rumors were true, it does not mean they’ll stop hedging their bets. Today’s demonstration in Midan Tahrir, which included Brotherhood MPs, also suggests that part of the Brotherhood is still making political calculations — i.e. ones based on continued political participation rather than a retreat for which, in counterpart, the regime would give greater it influence on social and religious affairs.

[For background.]

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