Arab News Blog

Egypt has yet again extended its State of Emergency by two years.

Those my age may recall a running joke back when Saturday Night Live first debuted in the 1970s: the newscast reporting that Generalissimo Francisco Franco was still dead. For Egypt, the Emergency’s continual renewals are not only a reminder that Anwar Sadat is still dead, but that, almost 29 years since his assassination, the reaction to the assassination is ongoing. For indeed, that’s what the Emergency stems from. Of course, Sadat would turn 92 this year and even Mubarak will presumably retire by that age, but the Emergency persists.

In the 2005 Presidential elections, the first in which Husni Mubarak competed directly against a range of opposition candidates (without any danger of losing, of course), he promised to lift the Emergency Law and replace it with an anti-terrorism law. This has not yet happened, but heck, it’s only been five years, and it’s not like he has a rubber-stamp Parliament. (Oh, wait. He does.) Prime Minister Ahmad Nazif explained in his speech on extending the Emergency (a speech left to the Prime Minister as Chief Technocrat, not to the President to whom, as we learn below, the law is “abhorrent”):

To that end, the President of the Republic committed himself in his electoral platform to lift the state of emergency and formulate a new counter terrorism law which would balance personal freedom with the interests and security of society. The Government reiterated this commitment a few weeks ago before the UN Human Rights Council, and today the Government restates this commitment to the representatives of the nation to lift the state of emergency as soon as a balanced law is adopted which does not permit the use of extraordinary investigation measures unless necessary to counter terrorism, and then only under complete supervision by the judiciary. The Government is committed to presenting this law for public discussion, and to deliberate on it with the National Council for Human Rights and the civil society organisations.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Previously the Government had stated that it was requesting an extension of the state of emergency even though it was abhorrent to it, because we do not wish to govern under extraordinary conditions, but at the same time we do not wish to squander what we have achieved. Our achievements may not rise to the level of our ambitions or fulfil all our hopes, but we hold on to them, desiring to improve and develop them. They were not achieved easily, surrounded as we are by an unstable region, threats of terrorism around the world, and an unforeseen severe financial crisis. Nonetheless, and notwithstanding these conditions, we have been able to implement gradual political reform, and achieved economic growth which many states failed to accomplish. We were able to create job opportunities for our youth, and we are committed to increase them and wipe out unemployment, which is our highest priority and a major weapon against terrorism.

While it would be unjust to credit the stability we enjoy, and which has permitted us to achieve so much, to the emergency law alone, it would also be unjust to ignore the fact that the application of the emergency law has spared the nation the threats of terrorism and stopped many terrorist crimes before they could be committed.

Yes, the government is again extending the State of Emergency even though it is “abhorrent to it.” (Full English text of the speech can be found here.) It’s purely to prevent terrorism and narcotics trafficking. (And Oceania has always been at war with Eurasia.)

Even so, Nazif went out of his way to make it clear that this would be a kinder, gentler Emergency Law. The government is sensitive to the bad reputation the law carries with it, and is trying to soften it a bit.

But if the tone of the renewal is a bit Orwellian, let’s be fair to the Egyptian government here as well. In Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, nobody bothered to pass Emergency Laws. There was no effort to pretend to a rule of law. Egypt at least keeps officially extending the Emergency. Yes, it restricts freedom of expression, assembly, and much else. But Egypt for all its faults is not Saddam’s Iraq, Asad’s Syria, or even Ben ‘Ali’s Tunisia. There is an independent press which can criticize the Emergency Law, here for example, a still relatively independent judiciary which is divided over extending the law, and the renewed but kinder, gentler law will, apparently, be more limited.

Egyptians sometimes note that they come in for a lot of Western criticism even though their press and society is, in many ways, freer than a lot of other Arab countries. The criticism is accurate but, I think, misunderstands the reasons for the critique. Egypt is still the largest Arab country, the country so many others have followed and looked to; it was one of the first to defy colonial rule and one of the first to evoke pan-Arab emotions. It has also been one of the most liberal and open societies in the Arab world, outside of Lebanon at least, and it has the oldest media and the richest cinema and television culture.

Of those to whom much is given, much is expected. Egypt is arguably the oldest culture in the world, certainly the oldest unified nation. It has a deep, rich role in Arab history and in the history of Arab nationalism. Egyptians would be (rightly, I think) insulted if one compared them to Yemen or Jordan or Libya, so the government really should not be tempted by the “we’re not as bad as Syria” argument.

And, precisely because the press is freer and more independent, it’s easier to see the failings. I don’t expect Egypt anytime soon to replicate what happened yesterday in London, when after 13 years in office the ruling party handed over power to the opposition, letting the Queen do the one constitutional duty left to her. But even though there is considerable openness in Egypt compared to its Arab neighbors, the Emergency Law remains a thorn in the side of the opposition, and its renewal, even if in kinder, gentler, form, is a constant reminder that Egypt’s relatively open society (though lacking political democracy) can still be constrained and the open windows closed at any time.

Criticism of Egyptian lack of democracy is not because it is the worst Arab country in these matters, but because it is one of the best, but still falls so short of what it could be.

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Having done my bit for end-of-year posts, the Iron Laws of Journalism (imposed by the Because Everybody Else Does It committee) say I must also do a post-New Year’s looking ahead post or two. So here goes. Elections first.

In 2010 we know for certain we will have elections in, most importantly:

• Jordan. Date not yet set but I believe given the date of dissolution they need to be held by March.

• Iraq. Set for March 7. They were constitutionally due by January but all the hi-jinks about the electoral law caused slippage. Perhaps the most important of the lot.

• Palestinian Authority. God only knows, but June 28 is I gather the current official date awaiting further postponement. Presidential elections on hold. Parliamentary elections on hold. Originally a Palestinian Presidential election was due in 2009 and a Parliamentary election in January 2010. Then things started slipping and currently they’re seemingly aiming for June 28. But Hamas is boycotting and banning a vote in Gaza. Unless I’m out of date. Mahmoud ‘Abbas isn’t running. Probably.

• Egypt. Parliamentary elections required by October. Still some rumors that the 2011 Presidential poll might get moved forward.

• Bahrain, Parliamentary elections, November.

Outliers and periphery: Other elections due this year in our region broadly defined are in Tajikistan (Parliamentary, February 21), Sudan (Parliamentary and Presidential, April 5-12), Somaliland (separatist part of ex-Somalia, Presidential, April), Nagorno-Karabakh (Parliamentary, June), Somaliland again (Parliamentary, September),

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Al-Hayat reporting in Arabic surveyed the reactions of Iraqi politicians to the massive bombings on Sunday. As with Prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, they blamed remnants of the former, Baath, regime and “al-Qaeda” (Sunni fundamentalist militants). I was struck by how they for the most part responded technocratically, by pledging a review and an improvement of security procedures.

As I predicted yesterday, some figures are already using the blasts for politics. Hadi al-Ameri, a member of parliament and a leader of the paramilitary hard line Shiite Badr Corps, implicitly came after al-Maliki. “We’ve heard a lot of brouhaha about successes on the security front,” he said. “Where are these successes?” The Badr Corps is aligned with its parent organization, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), which is running against al-Maliki’s State of Laws coalition in January.

Al-Zaman reports on some of the casualties. A woman member of parliament, Maha al-Duri, was wounded and two of her bodyguards were killed. The lieutenant governor of Baghdad Province was wounded. Several members of the Sadr Bloc were wounded as they were commemorating the anniversary of the death of Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr in the Justice Ministry building.

Meanwhile, one of the more contentious issues in the upcoming parliamentary elections is how to deal with the contested province of Kirkuk. The USG Open Source Center translates an article from the Kurdish press in which major Kurdish parties threaten to boycott the elections if a special election law for Kirkuk is passed. (Kirkuk is by now probably majority Kurdish, so the Kurds will dominate its provincial council unless the Kurdish bloc is diluted by special provisions in the electoral law).

Iraqi Kurdish lists to boycott elections if consensus not reached
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
Saturday, October 24, 2009
Document Type: OSC Summary

Iraqi Kurdish lists to boycott elections if consensus not reached

The Kurdistan Alliance and the Islamic Union of Kurdistan (IUK) lists have said they would boycott the Iraqi upcoming parliamentary elections if a special election law for Kirkuk is passed, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) media website reported on 24 October.

The alliance and the IUK’s representatives expressed their concerns in a press conference which was held today in the Iraqi parliament’s office in Arbil Governorate.

The deputy head of the alliance, Sa’di Barzinji, said in the press conference that there were elements in the Iraqi parliament who wanted to pass a special election law for Kirkuk, adding that such efforts were contrary to the country’s constitution.

We, the Kurds, work in accordance with the Iraqi constitution, and the country’s High Constitutional Court has rejected a special election law for Kirkuk, Barzinji said.

Barzinji said that no changes were made to the voter registration, referring to these elements’ demand for a special election law.

He said that the increase in Kirkuk’s voter registration was only 30 per cent, while in other parts of Iraq was 100 per cent. He added that the number of Kurds in the city was significantly reduced during the country’s former regime and thousands of them were killed in the area.

Barzinji said that they would not allow the special election law to pass, even if it is passed, Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, can veto it twice and that the law also needed 66 per cent of the parliamentary votes to be passed.
Barzinji said that the Kurds would not participate in the elections if such law is passed; and the Kurds wanted an open election system.

Meanwhile, the IUK’s MP in the Iraqi parliament, Zuhair Khoshnaw, said that his list would not allow a special election law to pass for Kirkuk, adding that the efforts to pass the law were contrary to the constitution.

Khoshnaw said that the Kurds wanted Kirkuk to be treated like other parts of the country. He added that if they did not reach an agreement with the other parties in the parliament, they would refer the issue to the Iraqi political council.

(Description of Source: (Internet) Patriotic Union of Kurdistan in Sorani Kurdish — Patriotic Union of Kurdistan media website)

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President Barack Obama’s meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki on Tuesday generated few deadlines, but some important things were said.

Obama stressed the need for the Iraqi parliament to pass an election law to enable parliamentary elections to be held on January 16. If the law isn’t passed soon, the elections won’t be held on schedule.

This delay would be a severe problem for the US military, which is stuck in Iraq without much to do but waiting to play one last big role, in closing down the country and providing enough security so that elections can be held. While the Iraqi army has gotten better at doing independent patrols and taking on gangs and militias in Shiite areas, it still is not very much in control of the Sunni regions, and it is not clear that it could oversee elections even in the wilder Shiite provinces such as Maysan. (That Iraq still cannot hope to have a simple election without massive security and the prohibition of vehicular traffic for 3 days speaks eloquently to how hard a row genuine democracy still has in that country. That US troops are available for joint patrols with the Iraqi army, which it helped train, but that the Iraqi army is studiedly disinterested, shows how much Americans are actually disliked in Iraq, a very nationalistic country that feels itself run roughshod over).

Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that the Iraqi parliament has thrown up its hands in despair about crafting an election law. Many parliamentarians haven’t even been coming to the sessions, because there is such bad blood among the MPs over this and other issues. Some blame the intransigence of the Kurdistan Alliance, which is sensitive about the conditions under which elections are conducted in Kirkuk Province, which the Kurdistan Regional Government wants to annex, but the annexation of which is opposed by Arabs and Turkmen.

So parliament is asking the Political Council for National Security to draft the legislation, and to have parliament simply conduct an up and down vote on the resulting bill. The PCNS consists of President Jalal Talabani, Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, Vice President Adil Abdul Maliki, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and Kurdistan Regional Government president Massoud Barzani. The council is not specified in the constitution, much less having been given a legislative role, and some critics of this plan are complaining that it is unconstitutional.

It takes 90 days to organize an election in Iraq, so last Monday was technically the deadline for the passage of the legislation. The election must be held by Jan. 31 to be constitutional. The prospect of another sketchy election, after the fiasco in Afghanistan, is worrying the UN and the US military.

Meanwhile, what is probably the last of three major political coalitions was announced on Tuesday, and is analyzed by Reidar Vissar. It comprises both the Sunni Awakening Councils of al-Anbar under the leadership of Abu Risha, and the coterie of Interior Minister Jawad al-Bulani, a Shiite independent. Reidar hails it as cross-sectarian but admits that it may not amount to much in the actual election. I concur in his pessimism. My guess is that the Shiite religious coalition and the Government of Laws coalition (mainly the Islamic Mission or Da’wa Party) of PM al-Maliki will be the major Arab forces in the election, and will likely go into a post-election coalition with one another, preserving the dominance of the religious Shiites.

One wild card is that the Iraqi constitution stipulates that the largest single party in parliament gets the first shot at forming a government. If al-Maliki’s party doesn’t do as well as he expects, he could well lose the prime ministership. Since some of the improved security in Iraq derived from al-Maliki’s talent in gaining control of the army and security forces, and since a new prime minister may not be as adept, the post-election situation in Iraq could be very unstable. That situation would in turn put pressure on the Obama administration to slow the US troop drawdown, at a time when Afghanistan will likely still be very hot and making demands on the administration’s resources. Bush bequeathed Obama two major wars, and it would be ironic if Iraq and Afghanistan both deteriorate simultaneously, putting a squeeze play on the administration and endangering its reelection prospects.

Here is the White House video of the Obama/al-Maliki press conference. (Al-Maliki looks a little impatient during the long preface on Afghanistan issues, which surely signal which country is more important to President Obama). The emphasis on investment opportunities in Iraq is probably premature; if a country can’t hold elections without a large foreign army’s help, it is too soon to make big investments in it.

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Mortars were fired in Baghdad, killing 7, and three bombs went off in the Shiite holy city of Karbala, killing 4 and wounding 48. The bombings were near to holy Shiite shrines, which is extremely dangerous. The bombing of the golden dome at Samarra in February of 2006 set off a vicious Sunni-Shiite civil war that killed thousands each month. The shrine of Imam Husayn, the Prophet’s martyred grandson, in Karbala is among the holiest sites of Shiite Islam.

Al-Zaman reports in Arabic that Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has ordered the closing for one week of Mustansiriya University in downtown Baghdad and the banning of partisan political activity on campus. The moves alarmed the PM’s critics, who worry that he is gradually abolishing the freedom of speech in the new Iraq and making himself a strongman.

Aljazeera English has video:

Mustansiriya’s student government and administration has been dominated by the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and by the Sadr Movement, two Shiite religious parties that are rivals of the Islamic Mission (Da’wa) Party of PM al-Maliki. Although Western reporters for some odd reason want to depict Da’wa as more secular than the others, it is not. It is, however, less puritanical than the Sadrists and led by lay fundamentalists rather than by clerics, in contrast to ISCI. Since ISCI and the Sadrists are part of the National Iraqi Alliance coalition contesting the upcoming parliamentary elections, and Maliki’s Da`wa is running against them on the Government of Laws slate, there is bad blood among the Shiite fundamentalist parties at the moment.

Mustansiriya U.’s president was Imad al-Husayni of the Islamic Supreme Council of iraq. Then Minister of Higher Education Abd Dhiyab al-`Ujayli dismissed al-Husayni and appointed Taqi al-Musawi as university president. But al-Husayni refused to step down. So Mustansiriya U. limped along with two administrations that were constantly fighting with one another.

Then PM al-Maliki stepped in and appointed a third man, a professor in the School of Education, as leader of the university. But that only produced three rival administrations. But beyond personality conflicts, the religious parties and the student unions they dominate were jockeying with one another.

When al-Maliki appointed a personal friend as president, it set off two days of student demonstrations and protests, on Monday and Tuesday, demanding al-Husayni’s reinstatement (i.e. the student unions controlled by ISCI were attempting to flex their muscles). In Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein, institutions of higher education have often come to be controlled by fundamentalist political parties, who then give preference to student party members from their party in the admissions process and also favor party members for faculty posts. That is, universities are often part of the same spoils system that operates in government ministries. Having control of a university has many benefits for a party, since it provides it with opportunities for patronage, and gives it a large, visible social space and lots of potential campaign workers.

So al-Maliki was perceived as shifting Mustansiriya out of the ISCI column and making an attempt to put it under the control of his Islamic Mission Party.

Al-Maliki has reacted to the strikes and demonstrations by closing the university down for a while and dissolving the party-based student organizations, attempting to depoliticize student activism. It remains to be seen whether the closing will have much effect, and whether it is really possible to stop politics on campus by fiat.

As for the charge that al-Maliki is acting unconstitutionally in forbidding partisan political activities on campus, it has merit. It would be as though US universities were forbidden to host the Young Republicans or the Young Democrats. Iraq may or may not regain political stability any time soon, but the likelihood that it will have democratic government is low.

Ominously, Iraq has had to slash its government budget and is running a substantial budget deficit this year which is impeeding both spending on civilian infrastructure and the purchase of military equipment.

And, the Kurdistan Regional Government and al-Maliki’s Baghdad are sparring over oil exports. The Kurds are on strike, refusing to export the 100,000 barrels a day their region typically had been sending out through federal government pipelines. A deep Kurdish-Arab divide could end the alliance Kurdish parties have had with the Shiites in parliament, and set the stage for one more civil war.

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