Arab News Blog

Al Sharq al Awsat/ here

“Political observers can only admire the way in which Damascus is bringing together its regional political cards, and its proficiency in dealing with the contradictions and conflicting forces [in the region], as well as its ability to overcome crises that seem grave and capable of toppling any regime. The best example of this can be seen in what happened over the past few days. At the same time that dozens of cooperation agreements were being signed during Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s visit [to Damascus] following years of tense relations with Lebanon and the March 14 Alliance, Syria was also holding meetings between Iraqi rivals Iyad Allawi and Muqtada al-Sadr, in what appeared to be western-backed Syrian mediation to help solve the deadlock with regards to the formation of the new government of Iraq, which is a process that has been stalled for months.

Syria’s relations with Lebanon…. and accusations ….. with Baghdad and the US forces in Iraq accusing Damascus of facilitating the entry of insurgents and suicide bombers [into Iraq]……Damascus developed good political and economic relations with Turkey, which had previously deployed its troops along the Syrian border during the presidency of Hafez al-Assad,…… with Iran, despite the strong ideological differences between the Iranian and Syrian regimes…… Washington is keen to open channels with Damascus as part of a policy that aims to exert influence on Syria’s [political] inclination through dialogue and pressure,.. also a policy that is being pursued by Europe. However there is still Israel and the issue of the occupation of the Golan Heights …….

How is Damascus able to bring together all of these contradictions and play its cards in this manner? Is this skill, or a special kind of shrewdness, or cunning, as some like to suggest?

Certainly there is a certain pragmatic shrewdness. However [Syria's] policy is not governed by shrewdness alone, but rather the countries geographic location,…. Damascus has benefited from this strategic position and its importance with regards to the security of this region, whether internationally or regionally …”

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A series of coordinated attacks on checkpoints and a Shiite mosque on Monday in Iraq demonstrated that the guerrilla opposition to the US-imposed new order in that country continues to be active and organized. Some 300-400 civilians and members of security forces are still being killed in political violence every month, not counting the insurgents themselves. The death rate from such violence appears little changed this year from last. The attacks continue to make economic progress difficult; they often disrupt the work (and even destroy the edifices) of government agencies, and they discourage foreign investment. Attacks on Shiite mosques are intended to provoke reprisals against Sunni Arabs, sharpening the contradictions and polarization and making Sunnis easier to recruit and mobilize for the resistance.

Meanwhile, one of the only ways mainstream Sunni Arabs, about 17 percent of the population, can hope to avoid another purely Shiite-Kurdish government would be to acquiesce in the formation of a government of national unity. That step would require the secular Iraqiya List, for which most Sunni Arabs voted, but which includes secular Shiites like its leader Iyad Allawi, to join the government. Thus, Al-Sharq al-Awsat (the Middle East) reports in Arabic that incumbent PM Nuri al-Maliki and Iraqiya leader Iyad al-Allawi have met to discuss a place at the table for the Iraqiya.

This move would have benefits for several parties. Al-Maliki campaigned against ex-Baathist secularists, but his current allies, the Shiite religious parties of Ammar al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr, seem insistent on replacing him with someone else, perhaps Ibrahim Jaafari. The Iraqiya might prefer al-Maliki, who has backed off purely sectarian language and speaks like an Iraqi nationalist, even though he remains head of the fundamentalist Islamic Mission Party (Da’wa), to a more sectarian candidate favored by the Sadrists. So, if al-Maliki can draw the Iraqiya in, it might be a way of outmaneuvering Muqtada al-Sadr, whose Mahdi Army al-Maliki attacked militarily in 2008. Ammar al-Hakim of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, which is close to Tehran, has in any case made it clear that he will not join a government from which Allawi’s list is excluded.

So the scenario I predicted soon after the March 7 election, of a core Shiite alliance but a government of national unity that includes Iraqiya and the Kurds, seems in train. It replicates the government of summer, 2006, when US ambassador Ryan Crocker worked hard at cementing it. This time, much of the work seems to be being done by the Iraqis themselves, sometimes reluctantly, as the need for political reconciliation bears in on them and they realize it is key to their future as a state.

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Al-Hayat reports in Arabic that despite their announced coalition, the religious Shiite State of Law and National Iraqi Alliance lists will probably have to resort to an up and down vote in parliament to choose the prime minister. The State of Law refuses to put forward any alternative to incumbent prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, who is unpopular with the Sadrists, who hold 38 of the National Iraqi Alliance’s 70 seats. Al-Maliki militarily attacked the Sadrist militia or Mahdi Army in spring of 2008 in Basra, and then in Sadr City.

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AP reports that guerrillas set off at least 4 car bombs in Baghdad on Friday, killing at least 69 persons and wounding hundreds. The target of four of the attacks was Shiite Muslim mosques or religious centers. Sunni Arab insurgents have lost the war in Iraq, but they have turned to occasional campaigns of massive bombings in a bid to act as spoilers.

There was also renewed violence in al-Anbar province.

Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki schizophrenically alleged that the bombings were a reprisal for the killing of two leaders of “al-Qaeda” in Iraq in recent days, but then went on to warn of the dangers still posed by the Baathists (secular Arab nationalists).

The most serious attack was on a mosque in the vast Shiite slum of East Baghdad, Sadr City, killing 36 persons and wounding some 200. In the wake of the bombings, Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr for the first time in two years tried to deploy his paramilitary. He asked that the Mahdi Army mobilize to protect mosques “in cooperation with” the state security forces. Another Sadrist spokesman, Baha’ al-A’raji, told Al-Hayat [Life] that the Mahdi Army had only been mothballed in hopes that the central government would strengthen and would provide security. He observed that that development had not yet taken place.

Iraq is still in the midst of attempting to form a government, and this sectarian violence is intended to disrupt that process.

The militia has been under severe pressure for the past two years, and its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, was forced into exile from Iraq in the holy city of Qom, where he is said to be acquiring the credentials that would lend him respect in the eyes of the world Shiite community. dozens of his top commanders have been arrested and put behind bars by the al-Maliki government.

Al-Hayat says that bombings targeted two other Shiite houses of worship. One was founded by the father of fraudster Ahmad Chalabi. The other mosque is associated with the US via the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. This mosque is that of Muhsin al-Hakim, grandfather of the leader of ISCI nowadays, Ammar al-Hakim. Muhsin al-Hakim had been the preeminent Shiite religious authority in the 1960s. Eight persons were killed and 26 wounded at the latter site.

Sadrist spokesman Salah al-Ubaidi blamed the poor procedures of Iraq’s 11th Army Division for the security breech. He contrasted them with those of the police.

Aljazeera English has a video report:

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The announcement of the discovery of a secret prison in Baghdad where Sunni Arabs suspected of involvement in guerrilla activities were held and sometimes tortured may have an effect on the shape of the next Iraqi government. Over 400 Sunnis were held at the facility. The revelation starts one thinking about the true character of Iraq’s ‘democracy.’

The London Daily ash-Sharq al-Awsat points out that the prison was administered by the ‘military office’ of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, who is presently attempting to form a government so as to enjoy a second term as the Iraqi head of state.

Baha al-A’raji, a Sadrist spokesman, confirmed that the movement has decided that not only will it reject the candidacy for prime minister of Nuri al-Maliki, but they do not want a prime minister from the Islamic Mission (Da’wa) Party at all.

The prison torture revelations may make it more difficult for al-Maliki to form an alliance with another potential partner, the Iraqi National List. That list had strong Sunni support. And, supporters of the Iraqiya list are already upset the recount of ballots in Baghdad province, which they fear al-Maliki will manipulate to his advantage.

One possibility is that the Shiite religious coalition will split, with a majority following Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. That division would allow al-Maliki to ally with the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, headed by cleric Ammar al-Hakim. If the two of them could do a deal with the Kurdistan Alliance, they could form a government.

But the price of going for broke with another Shiite-Kurdish alliance is that it would be unacceptable to the Sunni Arabs. The Iraqi National List of Allawi is already threatening to boycott any such government and to instead sit in the opposition and to refuse to join in a government of national unity.

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The straw poll conducted by the Sadr Movement, led by Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, produced the following results:

Ibrahim Jaafari, (National Reform Trend): 24%
Jaafar al-Sadr (State of Law), 23%
Qusay al-Suhail (Sadr Movement) 17%
Nuri al-Maliki (State of Law/ Da’wa): 10%
Iyad Allawi (Iraqi National Movement): 9%
Baha’ al-A’raji (Sadr Movement): 5%
Ahmad Chalabi (Iraqi National Alliance): 3%
Adil Abdul Mahdi (Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), 2%
Rafi al-Isawi (Iraqi Islamic Party [Sunni]): 2%

Although there is not really a clear winner, the Sadrists seem to be coalescing around Jaafari.

Jaafari leads a splinter of the Islamic Mission Party or Da’wa, and served as elected prime minister from spring 2005 through spring 2006. He was widely seen as ineffectual, and managed to anger all the major political players, especially the Kurds. He was accused of seeking Turkish help to forestall the absorption by the Kurdistan Regional Government of the oil province of Kirkuk.

The Sadrists only got 39 seats in the parliamentary election of March 7, in a parliament of 325. They are far too small to impose Jaafari on the other parties, many of which have a critique of him. In order to form a government, several parties will have to join together to get 163 seats. Moreover, al-Hayat quotes other members of the Iraqi National Alliance of Shiite fundamentalist parties as saying that they do not consider the referendum relevant to their choice for prime minister. Thus, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by young cleric Ammar al-Hakim, will not back Jaafari.

The two largest blocs garnered 91 and 89 seats in parliament respectively. Were the Iraqi National Alliance, which groups Shiite fundamentalist parties, including that of Sadr, to swing behind either of the frontrunners, it could put them in striking distance of forming a government. But the Sadrists deeply dislike incumbent PM Nuri al-Maliki of the Islamic Mission Party, and they likely aren’t wild about Iyad Allawi, a strong secularist, either.)

The main effect of the straw poll and the announced result is to make it harder for the Sadrists to rush into a coaltion. The move also gives them a bargaining chip in negotiating with the parties of Iyad Allawi and Nuri al-Maliki. For instance the Sadrists may be attracted to the State of Law list as a partner, but not want prime minister al-Maliki to lead the resulting coalition. They could now offer to give up Jaafari if their prospective partner would likewise give up its favored leader, so that a less well-known compromise candidate might emerge.

The negotiations over forming a new government probably just got lengthened, and they could well go into August.

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The headlines out of Iraq Sunday are mainly owing to the consequences of the US troop withdrawal from that country.

Update Three suicide bombs rocked the capital Sunday morning, in different districts, but each appearing to target foreign embassies, killing dozens. The Iranian and German embassies were among the targets. The Times of London correspondent also heard a report that a security firm may have been another target.

In a pre-dawn Saturday raid, Sunni Arab militants dressed as Iraqi army troops or US soldiers attacked families of the Jubur tribe thas actively patrolling Iraqi cities, and while it was paying the Awakening Council fighters directly, they were relatively safe. But as US troops have pulled back and as the government of PM Nuri al-Maliki has reduced the pay of these fighters and most often declined to induct them into the security forces, they have become increasingly vulnerable to such attacks. And this attack could well be the beginning of a vaster trend toward reprisals as the US departs and those who cooperated with it are coded as collaborators. (And as the US withdraws, foreign embassies and other institutions will require special protection by the Iraqi security forces or insurgents will try to force them out.)

Aljazeera English has video:

In other news, the Sadr Movement closed their two-day referendum on which prime ministerial candidate their party should support. The vote has been criticized for having insufficient safeguards to prevent multiple voting by a single individual and other forms of fraud. The referendum is in a sense non-binding, since it was held at the bidding of Muqtada al-Sadr and is not mandated in the constitution.

That Muqtada al-Sadr should have emerged as the kingmaker in Baghdad is also an artifact of the US withdrawal from Iraq. As the US fades, those movements that are able to mobilize the masses will no longer be curbed by the US military, and so can assert themselves politically.

Welcome to the glimmers of a post-American Iraq . . .

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The headlines out of Iraq Sunday are mainly owing to the consequences of the US troop withdrawal from that country.

In a pre-dawn Saturday raid, Sunni Arab militants dressed as Iraqi army troops or US soldiers attacked families of the Jubur tribe that had joined the pro-American ‘Awakening Councils’ or ‘Sons of Iraq,’ Killing 25 persons.

While the US was actively patrolling Iraqi cities, and while it was paying the Awakening Council fighters directly, they were relatively safe. But as US troops have pulled back and as the government of PM Nuri al-Maliki has reduced the pay of these fighters and most often declined to induct them into the security forces, they have become increasingly vulnerable to such attacks. And this attack could well be the beginning of a vaster trend toward reprisals as the US departs and those who cooperated with it are coded as collaborators.

Aljazeera English has video:

In other news, the Sadr Movement closed their two-day referendum on which prime ministerial candidate their party should support. The vote has been criticized for having insufficient safeguards to prevent multiple voting by a single individual and other forms of fraud. The referendum is in a sense non-binding, since it was held at the bidding of Muqtada al-Sadr and is not mandated in the constitution.

That Muqtada al-Sadr should have emerged as the kingmaker in Baghdad is also an artifact of the US withdrawal from Iraq. As the US fades, those movements that are able to mobilize the masses will no longer be curbed by the US military, and so can assert themselves politically.

Welcome to the glimmers of a post-American Iraq . . .

End/ (Not Continued)

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The party of Muqtada al-Sadr in the Iraqi parliament, with 39 seats, intends to hold a referendum on which prime ministerial candidate to support on this Friday and Saturday, according to al-Hayat writing in Arabic. Sadrist party offices and other party-affiliated buildings will be used for the polling stations. Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission refused to oversee the referendum, saying that their charge from the constitution is to simply ensure that parliamentary elections are upright. Spokesman Qusay Abdul Wahhab said that anyone would be allowed to vote in the referendum, not just known members of the Sadr Movement. Voters will be allowed to vote for one of five prominent candidates for prime minister: Iyad Allawi, Nuri al-Maliki, Jaafar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Adil Abdul Mahdi, and Ibrahim Jaafari. Allawi is an ex-Baathist secular Arab nationalist of Shiite heritage. Nuri al-Maliki, the current prime minister, heads up the State of Law coalition. Jaafar Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr ran on the State of Law slate (which has the Da’wa or Islamic Mission Party at its core), but as the son of the “First Martyr,” Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, he has a natural charisma should the State of Law decide to dump incumbent al-Maliki so as to stay in power. Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a major Iraqi cleric, was killed at Saddam’s hands in 1980. The list also includes Adil Abdul Mahdi, currently one of 2 vice presidents, who represents the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. Finally, Ibrahim Jaafari, the first post-Saddam prime minister, who broke off from al-Maliki’s Islamic Mission Party, is a possibility for voters.

Al-Hayat also reports that the Iraqiya list of Iyad Allawi is miffed that it was not invited to Iran this past weekend. He offered to go to Iran to work for a coalition, he said. Allawi expressed a willingness to go to Tehran if that is where the government is being formed. Both al-Maliki and Allawi are now showing flexibility and the willingness for the first time to form a government of national unity.

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I’ve been staying away from the Iraqi election standoff because I figure Juan Cole, Reidar Visser, Marc Lynch and others who follow it more closely than I do have been keeping track of it. But as things get more and more tangled, I guess I ought to offer a few thoughts. And while the various issues involved do not involve hanging chads (non-US readers can Google it), it’s still going to be a while before we see a government, I suspect. Here’s my attempt at a summation for the perplexed.

‘Iyad ‘Allawi’s Iraqiyya movement has the slight edge (91 seats to 89) over Prime Minister al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc. Though both men are Shi‘ites, ‘Allawi is a secularist allied in a front with Sunnis. Under at least one interpretation of the constitution, &lsqluo;Allawi, as leader of the party with the most seats, should have first crack at forming a coalition.

But there are two complicating factors. First, the Justice and Accountability Commission, the “De-Ba‘athification” commission led by Ahmad Chalabi (the onetime hero of the neocons, now seen as pro-Iranian) wants to disqualify six elected deputies. Three of them are from Iraqiyya, which means Maliki would have more seats than ‘Allawi. That attempt so far has not succeeded, but there’s another issue. While Iraqiyya is a multi-confessional secular movement with a lot of Sunni support, the religious Shi‘ite vote is divided between two blocks: Maliki’s State of Law and the Iraqi National Alliance, which includes the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq (formerly Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq) and Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement. Though the INA is more clearly Islamist and more indisputably pro-Iranian than Maliki’s, they have more in common with each other than either does with Iraqiyya.

Now the plot thickens again. The Federal Supreme Court has ruled that is constitutional for parties to form blocs in order to qualify as the largest bloc. This is being challenged by Iraqiyya, but could mean that an alliance between INA and Maliki could block ‘Allawi. But we’re likely to see more constitutional arguments.

There will be attempts by both sides to portray this as a fight between the US candidate, meaning ‘Allawi, and Maliki, who will be painted as too pro-Iranian. But Maliki was our guy too, and we should be careful to assume all Iraqi Shi‘ite religious-based parties are Iranian stalking horses (though it’s hard not to see Sadr that way).

So far, and I emphasize that qualification, this is playing out democratically: through the courts, the official commissions, protests to electoral bodies, etc. I think it would be a mistake to go all chicken-little and start proclaiming that Iraq is on the verge of sectarian war. (The US had the whole hanging chad thing in 2000, but when the Supreme Court ruled, it was accepted. Let’s give the Iraqis the benefit of the doubt.) It also occurs to me as ironic that what is, in fact, Iraq’s second general election, is as stalemated as the US’ second Presidential election in 1800, when John Adams ran against Thomas Jefferson but a (later fixed) Constitutional quirk allowed Aaron Burr to challenge Jefferson and throw the whole thing into the House of Representatives. I may be reaching a bit there, but hey, it’s my blog.

I would expect the rhetoric to escalate. ‘Allawi will be denounced as an American stooge and a creature of the CIA (and there’s at least circumstantial evidence that might be used against him), and he’ll doubtless try to paint his opponents as Iranian agents. Things are rarely that black and white. Let’s keep Western analysts’ rhetoric within limits and hope the Iraqis do the same. If ‘Allawi ends up as PM, we’ve worked with him before. If Maliki wins, ditto. I don’t intend to provide daily coverage of this, since the aforementioned other bloggers (especially Visser, but Cole’s a pretty detailed poster on this stuff) are looking at the nuts and bolts.

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