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Turki al-Faisal Slams US Policy in Afghanistan
Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal, longtime head of Saudi Intelligence and later Ambassador to London and Washington, has given a speech in which he sharply criticized US policies in Afghanistan. He has argued that US policy towards Hamid Karzai “beggars disbelief and amazement. Both sides are now filled with resentment and a sour taste in their mouths.”
For a figure with such close ties to the US, it’s a sharp critique. He urges the US to “get the terrorists, declare victory, and get out.” Here’s the longer version:
Afghanistan has a special place in my heart. I not only love the country and its people, but I also believe that it has not been given its due of peace and prosperity. It is a clear example of unilateral and naked ambition on the part of a former super power to change the status quo without regard to moral principle, international law, or human consideration. Alas, we have seen that repeated in Iraq by the other super power. What Afghanistan needs, now, is a shift from nation building to effectively countering terrorists. The point has been made that America and the rest of the world cannot accept that any country be the launching ground of terrorist activity as Afghanistan was from 1997 until today. The moral high ground which America acquired after September 11th has been dissipated since then because of American negligence, ignorance, and arrogance. Mr. Obama’s declared policy in Afghanistan is to go after the terrorists. He should do so. He should not be misdirected into believing that he can fix Afghanistan’s ills by military means. Hunt down the terrorists on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistan border, arrest them or kill them, and get out; and let the Afghan people deal with their problems. As long as GI boots remain on Afghan soil, they remain targets of resistance for the Afghan people and ideological mercenaries. The inept way in which this Administration has dealt with President Karzai beggars disbelief and amazement. Both sides are now filled with resentment and a sour taste in their mouths. How can they both get out of that situation, I don’t know. Nor can I pretend that future resentment and bad taste will not happen. The attempts being made now are a step in the right direction. That is why I suggest that America get the terrorists, declare victory, and get out. The Taliban of today are no longer the exclusively Pashtun warriors who ruled Afghanistan until 2002. They are now any and every Afghan of whatever ilk who raises arms against the foreign invaders. By declaring them the enemy, America has declared the people of Afghanistan the enemy. Here also, there should be no more platitudes and good wishes. Boots on the ground, chasing the terrorists is what is needed.
"…It will have to get much more catastrophic around the world to get a debate in the US on the pro-Israel influence…"

About that Saudi-Israeli handshake

A seemingly spontaneous Saudi-Israeli handshake at a European conference on security is mushrooming into what al-Quds al-Arabi calls an "unprecedented" public debate about the extent of official Arab-Israeli relations. The story isn’t especially interesting on its merits: Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon (most recently in the news for an ill-considered snub of the Turkish ambassador) seized the opportunity at a security conference in Munich the other day to maneuver former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal into an unprecedented public handshake.
While it might not seem like much, the picture of the handshake has rocketed through Arab politics and has become the focal point for an unusually blunt public discourse on the well-known reality of official Arab ties to Israel. The way the story is playing out is an object lesson in the power of publicity in Arab politics and in the limits of the much-mooted new "alliance" between Arabs and Israel against Iran. It shows both that many Arab leaders are indeed perfectly willing to work with the Israelis, but also that the political costs of this in the Arab sphere remain high — and that Israel’s policies towards Gaza and the Palestinians really do have a cost even if Arab leaders themselves don’t seem to much care.
For the Netanyahu government, the handshake was something of a coup. It allows Israel to claim that its diplomatic isolation is less than it appears, and that the costs of their polices towards Gaza and the Palestinians are less than believed. It offered a rare glimpse of the possibility of normalization with the Arabs at a time when a sense of siege prevails. It reinforces the popular Israeli and American narrative that the Arabs are moving towards alignment with Israel in the face of a common Iranian threat, and that the immobilized peace process does not stand in the way.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, it was deeply embarrassing to the Saudis for Prince Turki to be photographed publicly shaking hands with Israel’s Foreign Minister at a time when Israeli policies and its government are more loathed in the Arab world than ever. A succession of top Saudi officials, including King Abdullah, have repeatedly insisted that there would be no normalization or peace with Israel until it accepted a two-state solution along the lines of the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative. Prince Turki therefore put out a statement that Ayalon had been apologizing for
insulting the Kingdom, and that the handshake did not mean Saudi recognition of Israel (Ayalon tweeted that this was "as fanciful as Arabian Nights stories").
The Arab media (at least the non-Saudi owned Arab media) is having a field day. Many commentators are taking the opportunity to highlight the extent of official Saudi and Arab contacts with Israel, with Turki in particular identified as a "specialist" in meeting with Israelis at international conferences. Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar uses the "warm greeting" as a window into the long history of open and secret meetings between Arab officials and Israelis. I could give many, many more examples. Calling these meetings an "open secret" overstates their "secrecy"– such contacts have long been reported and discussed. The photograph has crystallized the issue for the moment, as fleeting as the moment is likely to be.
The handshake affair is worth a post because it both reinforces and undermines the emerging conventional wisdom in Washington that the Arab regimes and Israelis are increasingly allies against Iran. Such expectations of an Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran are hardly new. The Saudis and Egyptians were more or less openly aligned with Israel in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 (remember Condi Rice’s "birth pangs of the new Middle East"?), and to a lesser extent in the war on Gaza in 2008. Even in public, the "new Arab cold war" of the last few years has fairly openly and directly aligned the conservative Arab regimes with Israel against Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the "Resistance" bloc. Much of the official and Saudi-owned Arab media has for years been waging a heavy-handed campaign against the Resistance bloc, implicitly adopting many Israeli frames (Hamas and Hezbollah irrationality and irresponsibility, Arab moderation, Iranian threat).
But the Saudi pushback on the photo also shows the ongoing sensitivity of such relations, and the limits of the official media campaign in support of this supposed Arab-Israeli alignment. The images from Gaza and the ongoing impact of Netanyahu and Lieberman’s foreign policy has more than overwhelmed all the efforts to justify and legitimate such an approach to the broader Arab public. That anger is real, and quite potent in many Arab countries and in the wider Arab public sphere. The Saudis prefer to keep such relations private because of this very real outrage, and the real political costs of being on the wrong side in public.
It’s a common mistake to assume that only the private views of leaders or only public discourse matters. Both levels matter, the private Realpolitik of Arab leaders and the real passions of the Arab public. The depth of the gap between the private views of Arab leaders and the predominant views of the Arab public explains much of the vitriol of the current "Arab cold war". Many Arabs are worried about Iran, no doubt about it, and many in the official camp are deeply hostile to Hamas, Hezbollah, and most other forms of populist opposition. But most also continue to be genuinely outraged by Israeli policies and reject any public relationship. It’s a cliche to say so but also true: don’t expect the much-predicted Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran to ever live up to its hype (at least publicly) without real movement towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The Saudi-Israeli Handshake

A seemingly spontaneous Saudi-Israeli handshake at a European conference on security is mushrooming into what al-Quds al-Arabi calls an "unprecedented" public debate about the extent of official Arab-Israeli relations. The story isn’t especially interesting on its merits: Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon (most recently in the news for an ill-considered snub of the Turkish ambassador) seized the opportunity at a security conference in Munich the other day to maneuver former Saudi intelligence chief Turki al-Faisal into an unprecedented public handshake.
While it might not seem like much, the picture of the handshake has rocketed through Arab politics and has become the focal point for an unusually blunt public discourse on the well-known reality of official Arab ties to Israel. The way the story is playing out is an object lesson in the power of publicity in Arab politics and in the limits of the much-mooted new "alliance" between Arabs and Israel against Iran. It shows both that many Arab leaders are indeed perfectly willing to work with the Israelis, but also that the political costs of this in the Arab sphere remain high — and that Israel’s policies towards Gaza and the Palestinians really do have a cost even if Arab leaders themselves don’t seem to much care.
For the Netanyahu government, the handshake was something of a coup. It allows Israel to claim that its diplomatic isolation is less than it appears, and that the costs of their polices towards Gaza and the Palestinians are less than believed. It offered a rare glimpse of the possibility of normalization with the Arabs at a time when a sense of siege prevails. It reinforces the popular Israeli and American narrative that the Arabs are moving towards alignment with Israel in the face of a common Iranian threat, and that the immobilized peace process does not stand in the way.
At the same time, and for the same reasons, it was deeply embarrassing to the Saudis for Prince Turki to be photographed publicly shaking hands with Israel’s Foreign Minister at a time when Israeli policies and its government are more loathed in the Arab world than ever. A succession of top Saudi officials, including King Abdullah, have repeatedly insisted that there would be no normalization or peace with Israel until it accepted a two-state solution along the lines of the 2002 Saudi Peace Initiative. Prince Turki therefore put out a statement that Ayalon had been apologizing for
insulting the Kingdom, and that the handshake did not mean Saudi recognition of Israel (Ayalon tweeted that this was "as fanciful as Arabian Nights stories").
The Arab media (at least the non-Saudi owned Arab media) is having a field day. Many commentators are taking the opportunity to highlight the extent of official Saudi and Arab contacts with Israel, with Turki in particular identified as a "specialist" in meeting with Israelis at international conferences. Lebanon’s Al-Akhbar uses the "warm greeting" as a window into the long history of open and secret meetings between Arab officials and Israelis. I could give many, many more examples. Calling these meetings an "open secret" overstates their "secrecy"– such contacts have long been reported and discussed. The photograph has crystallized the issue for the moment, as fleeting as the moment is likely to be.
The handshake affair is worth a post because it both reinforces and undermines the emerging conventional wisdom in Washington that the Arab regimes and Israelis are increasingly allies against Iran. Such expectations of an Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran are hardly new. The Saudis and Egyptians were more or less openly aligned with Israel in its war against Hezbollah in 2006 (remember Condi Rice’s "birth pangs of the new Middle East"?), and to a lesser extent in the war on Gaza in 2008. Even in public, the "new Arab cold war" of the last few years has fairly openly and directly aligned the conservative Arab regimes with Israel against Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah and the "Resistance" bloc. Much of the official and Saudi-owned Arab media has for years been waging a heavy-handed campaign against the Resistance bloc, implicitly adopting many Israeli frames (Hamas and Hezbollah irrationality and irresponsibility, Arab moderation, Iranian threat).
But the Saudi pushback on the photo also shows the ongoing sensitivity of such relations, and the limits of the official media campaign in support of this supposed Arab-Israeli alignment. The images from Gaza and the ongoing impact of Netanyahu and Lieberman’s foreign policy has more than overwhelmed all the efforts to justify and legitimate such an approach to the broader Arab public. That anger is real, and quite potent in many Arab countries and in the wider Arab public sphere. The Saudis prefer to keep such relations private because of this very real outrage, and the real political costs of being on the wrong side in public.
It’s a common mistake to assume that only the private views of leaders or only public discourse matters. Both levels matter, the private Realpolitik of Arab leaders and the real passions of the Arab public. The depth of the gap between the private views of Arab leaders and the predominant views of the Arab public explains much of the vitriol of the current "Arab cold war". Many Arabs are worried about Iran, no doubt about it, and many in the official camp are deeply hostile to Hamas, Hezbollah, and most other forms of populist opposition. But most also continue to be genuinely outraged by Israeli policies and reject any public relationship. It’s a cliche to say so but also true: don’t expect the much-predicted Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran to ever live up to its hype (at least publicly) without real movement towards Israeli-Palestinian peace.
The Ayalon-Prince Turki Handshake
We’re still digging out here from the big storm and the Federal Government (and MEI which follows the Feds) will be closed tomorrow, though I’ll be posting here. First though, in case you missed it, one of the big subjects of discussion in the region is the handshake at a security conference in Munich between Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Dany Ayalon and Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal (former head of Saudi Intelligence, former Ambassador to London, former Ambassador to the US — and he was a year ahead of me at Georgetown). Here’s Ha’aretz here, Kuwait’s Al-Qabas here, Jerusalem Post here, and Prince Turki’s explanation of the handshake to the Saudi Arab News here.
It’s in the first six or seven seconds of this YouTube video; Turki is obviously seated in the front row and Ayalon is on his way to join the panel.
Between a Saudi Prince and an Israeli official, I disbelieve the Saudi prince more
“In al-Arabiya interview, Prince Turki al-Faisal says Israeli deputy foreign minister expressed his regret over remarks he made about Saudi Arabia. According to official, he told Ayalon, ‘I accept your apology, on the Turkish ambassador’s behalf as well.’ Ayalon denies apologizing.” Both are liars of course, but Saudi princes lie more. (thanks Olivia)
When professors meet these days
So yesterday, it was interesting. You have professors from around the US meeting and comparing notes about budget cuts at their respective universities, including private universities. I was delighted that my mentor, Michael Hudson, informed me that they will be naming a special fellowship at Georgetown after Hanna Batatu. It seems that Prince Turki will be spending yet another period at Georgetown.
I-P: Borders first– and fast?
The usually well-informed Akiva Eldar has an important piece in today’s Haaretz, reporting this:
- Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians will resume next month on the basis of an understanding that the establishment of a Palestinian state will be officially announced in two years.
Palestinian and European Union sources told Haaretz that talks will initially focus on determining the permanent border between Israel and the West Bank.
… It is understood that this will be accompanied by a public American and European declaration that the permanent border will be based on the border of June 4, 1967. Both sides may agree to alter the border based on territorial exchanges.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s refusal to discuss Jerusalem and the Palestinian refugees in the initial negotiation stages will not be allowed to delay the announcement of an independent Palestinian state.
Likewise, Netanyahu’s demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people, and that the Arab world embark on normalizing ties with Israel, will not constitute preconditions to an “early recognition” of Palestine.
Eldar is also reporting that Netanyahu has expressed confidence that he’ll reach an “agreement” on some limited curbs on settlement construction with the Americans, very soon.
If Eldar’s report is accurate, which I assume to be the case, then I think this says some moderately good things about where Obama’s policy is heading.
I understand that Obama’s failure to win– or even, really to fight for– a complete settlement freeze has been very frustrating for the Palestinians But as I noted in this recent IPS piece,
- some seasoned analysts of Israeli-Arab negotiations argue that the main focus for Obama and all others who seek a fair and durable peace in the region should now be not the settlement-building issue, but to start – and win speedy completion of – the negotiation for a final peace agreement (FPA).
From that perspective, any further prolongation of the fruitless tussle over the settlements can be seen both as a huge time-waster and as a growing drain on Obama’s political capital domestically and internationally.
These analysts point out that any FPA will necessarily include a demarcation of the final borders between Israel and the future Palestinian state.
Once those lines are demarcated, the issue of whether and where Israel can build new housing for its people is instantly transformed. After border demarcation Israel can presumably build freely within its own final borders, consistent with international law.
But outside those borders not only will it be unable to continue its building programmes, but Israeli citizens already living there will rapidly come under Palestinian law.
And as the FPA goes into effect there will be no more Israeli military occupation of either or the West Bank, and thus no remaining problem, under international law, regarding Israeli settlers in those areas.
Demarcating a final border for Israel in the West Bank is something that Netanyahu and many of his allies in Israeli’s rightwing government have long been opposed to. Netanyahu’s Likud party traditionally considered the whole terrain between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean – and even a stretch of land east of the Jordan – to be part of the Biblical “Land of Israel”.
If Eldar’s account is accurate, here are the good aspects of what Obama seems to be planning:
- 1. Going for an agreement on those final-status borders first, and hopefully also fast.
2. Not getting sidetracked by either endless nickel-and-diming over an interim settlement freeze, or the terrible dead-end of a “Palestinian state with a provisional border,” or Israel’s demands that it needs to receive the Palestinians’ prior agreement to “recognize Israel as a Jewish state”, or whatever.
3. With regard to the interim settlement freeze idea– which seems as though it’ll go onto operation in only a very limited way– making no mention of any kind of mandatory Arab-state quid pro quos for that. (I see that Saudi Arabia’s very influential Prince Turki al-Faisal today reiterated in the NYT that the Kingdom is not prepared to engage in any normalization or or other peacebuilding measures until “after [the Israelis] have released their grip on Arab lands.” Absolutely no surprise there.)
4. Having the US and EU declare that the final border will be “based on the line of June 4, 1967″, though with mutually agreeable exchanges.
So, there seem to be much that is laudable and realistic in the plan as reported. Here, though, are one big thing and a number of slightly smaller things that we need to have spelled out before we express any enthusiasm for it:
- One big thing:
The “borders first” approach will not work unless the border-line and any other necessary arrangements regarding all of Jerusalem are also spelled out in the broader border delineation exercise. This is the case, for two reasons: Firstly because “Metropolitan Jerusalem” now constitutes such a large and such a pivotally placed portion of the West Bank that you literally cannot know what Palestinian-administered area you’re talking about in the West Bank unless you know where the line is and what the supplementary arrangement are for Jerusalem. Secondly, Jerusalem is of crucial political importance to all Palestinians as well as to 1.3 billion Muslims and 13 million Jews around the world.
My view on what might work in Jerusalem, fwiw, is that the Israelis would get the Jewish Quarter of the Old City and some but not all of the settlement blocs in occupied East Jerusalem, and the Palestinians would get the rest of the Old City and much but not all of the rest of occupied East Jerusalem, with the Palestinian concessions there being compensated with good chunks of land from elsewhere in 1948 Israel… Plus perhaps some kind of special international regime for some Holy Places.
Anyway, there needs to be a line through Jerusalem. We’re talking about two separate states with separate economies and different trading partners, etc. Over time, perhaps, the two states will want to cooperate, and Jerusalem will be a great locus for that. But for now, a clean divorce is so much better– in Jerusalem, as in the land of Israel/Palestine as a whole– than continuing in any form with the highly coercive and extremely damaging regime that has existed, including at the economic level, since 1967, and also, of course, since Oslo.
And here are the main other things that need to happen to make this path look good:
- 1. Obama still needs to spell out, repeatedly, that it is in the United States’ interest to see a sustainable peace agreement secured in a very speedy way… Enough with always trying to justify his diplomatic involvement on the basis that “it’s in Israel’s interest”, or “it’ll help make Israel more secure”, or whatever. Yes, those things will happen. But they will be by-products of him pursuing this final peace agreement for the two even more important reasons that (a) it’s the right and moral thing to do, and (b) it’s in the deeper interests of the US citizenry as a whole… And therefore, that even if the PM of Israel should disagree (shock! horror!) with what Obama plans to do, nonetheless he will proceed, undeterred by that opposition.
2. He needs to spell out that this whole approach is based on international law and international resolutions… And by the way, he needs to bring other countries/groupings into the “leadership process”, in addition to the US and the EU. This is not, and should not be seen as, a western/NATO project! It should derive its strength, clarity, and legitimacy from the United Nations, including from the resolutions of the UN Security Council.
3. Based on the preceding two points, he needs to make sure that the “model” of the negotiations is not just one in which “the Israelis and Palestinians get left in a room together to work things out between them.” That can never work. One side is, on the ground, a fearsome military and economic power that is occupying the land of the other. The other is a weak and oppressed (though numerous) group of people who’ve been living under the Israeli fist for many years. That is why both the US’s interest and the principles of international law need to be added into the equation to even things up. So that, for example, the negotiations “land swaps”, the refugee issue, or whatever don’t end up being completely– and over the medium haul, quite unsistainaby– resolved in Israel’s interest.
4. He needs, obviously, to find a way to include in the diplomacy in some way those parties that were not only excluded but also actively combated and opposed by GWB administration. That includes both Hamas and the five-million-plus Palestinian refugees. On Hamas, there is some modestly good news, in that the Speaker of the PLO’s ‘parliament’, Selim Zaanoun, is supposed to be in Gaza right about now, discussing formulas for bringing Hamas into the PLO… And of course, it is the PLO, not the Determinedly Interim Palestinian Authority, that under the Oslo formula is responsible for negotiating the final peace with Israel. (Even if Saeb Erakat does like to double- or triple-hat himself on occasion); and
5. Finally, this peace diplomacy on the Palestinian-Israeli track will be a lot more successful if it is seen as part of an intentionally synergizing push for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, that is, one that involves progress on the Syrian-Israeli track in tandem with– rather than, as in the past, in a considerably degree of competition with– the Palestinian-Israeli track.
Well, there’s my input into this. Let’s hope more than a few of the relevant power-that-be here in Washington listen to me, eh?
Links for 08.30.09 to 09.01.09
? BlackRock divests from Leviev, an ‘NYT’ advertiser (and guess who doesn’t report it) | "Note that the NYT’s op-ed page has run more than a dozen jewelry ads by now from Lev Leviev, and they’ve never mentioned anything about the campaign against him."
? Why Barack Obama’s energy-dependence talk is just demagoguery – By Prince Turki al-Faisal | Foreign Policy | A warning from Saudi's Prince Turki against "energy independence"?
? In Egypt’s Desert, an Oasis Blooms Anew – WSJ.com | Yet another article focusing on Siwa's ecolodges, owned by Mounir Neamatalla of EQI. No mention of the talk in Siwa of how Neamatalla has acquired much prime land in the area, though.
? Memo From Cairo – Hints of Pluralism in Egyptian Religious Debates – NYTimes.com | Slackman on the perennial "what is permissible in a conservative society" debate. I think what's important here is to recognize the role of private media (several owned and at times run by outright secularists) is offering platforms that is outside the conservative mainstream. This is Naguib Sawiris' explicit project with OTV; but it won't make much of a dent until you liberalize Hertzian (non-satellite) TV and radio.
? Morocco and its king: Popular but prickly | The Economist | On 10 years of M6.
? Riding the sea at Gaza – The National Newspaper | On surfing in Gaza.
? Untold Stories: Afghanistan: Vetting the Embeds | Nir Rosen on a PR company's report on him when he tried to embed in Afghanistan.

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