AFP – The Hezbollah Shiite militia on Friday inaugurated a “tourist complex” displaying its own heavy weapons and those left by Israel, to mark the 10th anniversary of Israel’s pullout from south Lebanon.
Al-Hayat says that Iran has approved al-Maliki as a potential prime minister and has even put some pressure on Muqtada al-Sadr, the clerical leader of the Sadrists, who is residing in the Iranian seminary center of Qom, to back off his rejection of al-Maliki. Al-Maliki is widely credited with an improvement in day to day security in the Shiite south and the capital, despite occasional bomb strikes by Sunni Arab insurgents.
One of al-Hayat’s sources maintained that Iran had brokered the coalition in order to deny secular ex-Baathist Iyad Allawi, a known CIA asset, out of the prime ministership, and to stop any move to internationalize the process of forming an Iraqi government (as Allawi has called for). Internationalizing the deliberations would give the United States, which supports Allawi, a disproportionate influence on the outcome. But the same source suggested that this arrangement was artificial and fragile, given its Iranian provenance, and that the coalition could easily fall apart long before it got around actually to forming a government.
If Muqtada will not be swayed, and the coalition cannot decide internally on a single name, then they are likely to go to parliament for a vote, according to some sources. Were that step to be taken, al-Hayat’s interviewees believe that al-Maliki would lose out, since he is not popular among sitting members of the Iraqi legislature.
Yesterday it had been announced that the two-party coalition hoped that Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani could appoint a committee of Shiite wise men to recommend a prime ministerial candidate from among four names, and could be persuasive with the Shiite coalition. But that hope appears already to be fading because of the intransigence of the Islamic Mission Party (Da’wa) MPs in the State of Law, who won’t back off al-Maliki under any circumstances.
It now emerges that the State of Law and the National Iraqi Alliance had agreed that if they could not come up with a single consensus candidate through their own deliberations, they would take the matter to a parliamentary vote.
Some sources the newspaper interviewed doubted, however, that al-Maliki would actually agree to go through with this arrangement in the end, because so many parliamentary blocs dislike him and would shoot his candidacy down.
But the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, led by cleric Ammar al-Hakim and a component of the National Iraqi Alliance, is said to strongly support a parliamentary vote, because it has excellent relations with all the other blocs.
The two wings of the new coalition are said to be continuing their negotiations in Iran even now. Hadi al-Ameri, leader of the Badr Corps is there. Badr is the paramilitary of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, and it had been trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Amiri is likely an intermediary with Brig. Gen. Qasim Sulaimani, head of the Jerusalem Brigades special forces of the IRGC, who is generally the liaison to Shiite militant groups outside Iran. Also there is Shaikh Jalal al-Din al-Saghir, another stalwart of the fundamentalist Supreme Council, and Abd al-Halim al-Zuhairi of the Da’wa Party as well as the head of one of its splinter groups, the ‘Da’wa Party – Iraq Organization.’ They are negotiating with Muqtada al-Sadr and Iranian officials in order to maintain the unity of the coalition and to reach final terms on the coalition.
Ammar al-Hakim declined to characterize the coalition as a merger, given the distinct visions and organizations that make it up. He also said that, given their strong electoral showings, the Kurdistan Alliance (44 seats) and the Iraqiya list (91 seats) had to be part of the government (i.e. be given cabinet seats in return for voting with the government).
Dhafer al-Ani of the Iraqiya list (secular nationalists), however, insisted that the government-formation process be internationalized. He said his bloc was galvanized in that direction by the merger of the two big Shiite religious lists and the meddling of Iran. He also maintained that the Iraqiya had the right to form the government, since it had the single largest bloc of deputies (91). But the Iraqi appeals court has has already ruled that post-election coalitions can be formed and that their total number of seats would be taken into account. The Iraqi constitution says that the group with the largest number of seats has first crack at forming a government. But now the new Shiite coalition has 159 seats, far more than Allawi’s 91. Since there is already a court ruling on the issue, it seems likely that the Iraqiya will just have to get over what has happened.
The pan-Arab London daily al-Hayat [Life] reports in Arabic that sources close to the two major Shiite coalitions have revealed that they will form a 10-person committee of “wise men” to choose the country’s prime minister.
The “wise men” will consist of or include prominent Shiite clerics chosen by Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the spiritual leader of the Shiites, according to AP.
The move comes in the wake of the sudden announcement the night before last that the Iraqi National Alliance (Sadrists, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, some others) and the State of Law (Islamic Mission Party or Da’wa and some others) will form a broad coalition. The step gives them a combined tally of 159 of 325 seats in parliament, only 4 short of the 51% required to form a government on the second ballot and then to rule effectively. Likely they will nevertheless seek to form a government of national unity.
The secular Iraqiya list, for which most Sunni Arabs voted denounced the move as having been orchestrated by Iran and returning Iraq to the sway of sectarian religious parties. But Iraqiya failed to form a government in its own right in part because of frictions between Sunni Arabs in the North and Kurds in the East, over the division of spoils.
The Shiite religious parties denied that they had already fixed on former prime minister Ibrahim Jaafari, who was widely viewed as ineffectual in 2005-2006. Still, the announcement of the new coalition was made in Jaafari’s house in Baghdad, which is unlikely to be completely without significance.
The clerical committee will choose among Ibrahim Jaafari, Adil Abdul Mahdi (current vice president and member of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq), Baqir Jabr and incumbent PM Nuri al-Maliki. Al-Maliki is fiercely disliked by the Sadr Movement, which controls some 40 seats in the new parliament, because he deployed the Iraqi military against their Mahdi Army militiamen in 2008. Some major clerics in the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala have also been extremely fierce critics of al-Maliki.
The Iraqi National Movement or Iraqiya, headed by former interim prime minister Iyad Allawi, denounced the Shiite super-coalition as a return to the bad old days of sectarian rule (i.e. 2005-2010) and said it was a move intended to exclude their party.
Still, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, headed by Ammar al-Hakim, insisted that it would not serve in any government that excluded any major party.
The communique from the new partners said, “An agreement has been reached on the formation of the largest parliamentary bloc, via the alliance of these two [Shiite religious] coalitions. This is a basic step intended to create an opening toward other national forces.”
AFP – The chief of Lebanon’s Shiite Hezbollah movement said on Saturday it had a “legal” right to own any weapon it wishes, but would not confirm or deny Israeli allegations it was stockpiling Scud missiles.
AP reports that guerrillas set off at least 4 car bombs in Baghdad on Friday, killing at least 69 persons and wounding hundreds. The target of four of the attacks was Shiite Muslim mosques or religious centers. Sunni Arab insurgents have lost the war in Iraq, but they have turned to occasional campaigns of massive bombings in a bid to act as spoilers.
There was also renewed violence in al-Anbar province.
Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki schizophrenically alleged that the bombings were a reprisal for the killing of two leaders of “al-Qaeda” in Iraq in recent days, but then went on to warn of the dangers still posed by the Baathists (secular Arab nationalists).
The most serious attack was on a mosque in the vast Shiite slum of East Baghdad, Sadr City, killing 36 persons and wounding some 200. In the wake of the bombings, Shiite leader Muqtada al-Sadr for the first time in two years tried to deploy his paramilitary. He asked that the Mahdi Army mobilize to protect mosques “in cooperation with” the state security forces. Another Sadrist spokesman, Baha’ al-A’raji, told Al-Hayat [Life] that the Mahdi Army had only been mothballed in hopes that the central government would strengthen and would provide security. He observed that that development had not yet taken place.
Iraq is still in the midst of attempting to form a government, and this sectarian violence is intended to disrupt that process.
The militia has been under severe pressure for the past two years, and its leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, was forced into exile from Iraq in the holy city of Qom, where he is said to be acquiring the credentials that would lend him respect in the eyes of the world Shiite community. dozens of his top commanders have been arrested and put behind bars by the al-Maliki government.
Al-Hayat says that bombings targeted two other Shiite houses of worship. One was founded by the father of fraudster Ahmad Chalabi. The other mosque is associated with the US via the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. This mosque is that of Muhsin al-Hakim, grandfather of the leader of ISCI nowadays, Ammar al-Hakim. Muhsin al-Hakim had been the preeminent Shiite religious authority in the 1960s. Eight persons were killed and 26 wounded at the latter site.
Sadrist spokesman Salah al-Ubaidi blamed the poor procedures of Iraq’s 11th Army Division for the security breech. He contrasted them with those of the police.
Al-Hayat reports in Arabic on the emergence of the Sadr Movement as the largest Shiite party within the Shiite fundamentalist coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance. The Free Independent (al-Ahrar) party that represented the Sadrists won 38 seats out of the 70 that the INA garnered, making the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the Islamic Virtue Party and other Shiite religious components of the list much smaller and less weightier in the coalition’s deliberations.
No sooner, the article says, than the election tallies began coming in did the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki begin gradually releasing Sadrist prisoners who had been in Iraqi penitentiaries for years. Al-Hayat’s sources say that in Babil Province, orders were received from the government to release members of the Sadr Movement, in an attempt to mollify that group.
Sadrist leader Liqa’ Al-Yasin said that the Sadrists have now become the spinal column of the Iraqi National Alliance. He said that the movement had demonstrated that it had a large public base, and asserted that that base is cultured, aware, and abiding by the principles both of Islamic Law and the Nation. Al-Yasin said that the Sadrists would work for the liberation of Iraq and the realization of national sovereignty. [Translation: they want US troops out of their country tout de suite.] He adds that other goals are to gain the release of prisoners and to take some of the burdens off the shoulders of ordinary citizens. Sadrist leaders said that “the next phase will concentrate on political action to end the Occupation altogether.”
Another Sadrist leader said that the movement has foresworn violence and that they would not take up arms again save in situation of dire necessity.
Meanwhile,
al-Hayat is also reporting that a couple of days ago representatives of the Sadr Movement and of al-Maliki’s State of Law met in Tehran in an Iranian-backed attempt quickly to form a new Shiite-dominated government. In Iran for the talks were President Jalal Talibani and his Shiite vice president, Adil Abdel Mahdi of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.
This move underlines the way in which Iraq’s election has geopolitical as well as local significance. Also that Iran is sitting pretty while the US prepares to withdraw.
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In an apparent bid to divide Shiites and Sunnis on the eve of Sunday’s parliamentary election, guerrillas on Saturday morning set off a bomb only 900 feet from the shrine of Imam Ali (which has the sort of place in the hearts of Shiite Muslims that the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome has for Catholics).
Iraqi cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, leader of the Sadr Movement within the National Iraqi Alliance, issued a fatwa or religious legal ruling on Friday insisting that believers must vote in Sunday’s election and terming going to vote “political resistance,” which produces success when a group is united, and ordering his adherents to unite. The WSJ says that the Sadrists are using very canny electoral techniques in a quest to ensure they win as many seats as possible in Sunday’s election.
If the Sadrists succeed in rallying the Shiite masses to vote as an act of defiance toward the US military presence and the complaisance of the al-Maliki government, it could change the political landcape.
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Al-Hayat [Life] reports via AFP Arabic on the poll just released by the National Media Center, which reports to Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s office. According to this sounding, the major coalitions will perform thusly in the March 7 parliamentary elections (rounding up to the nearest whole number):
State of Law (Nuri al-Maliki): 30%
Iraqi National Movement (Iyad Allawi): 22%
National Iraqi Alliance (Ammar al-Hakim and Muqtada al-Sadr): 17%
Kurdistan Alliance (Jalal Talibani and Massoud Barzani): 10%
Unity of Iraq (Jawad al-Bulani): 5%
Iraqi Accord Front (Iyad al-Samarraie): 3%
No Opinion: 5%
(State of Law: Shiite religious/ nationalist coalition of the current prime minister; Iraqi National Movement: coalition of secular Shiite and Sunni parties led by a former interim prime minister; National Iraqi Alliance: coalition of Shiite religious parties, including Sadrists and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq; Kurdistan Alliance: The major but not the only Kurdish political force; Unity of Iraq: party of Interior Minister, an independent Shiite; Iraqi Accord Front: Coalition of Sunni fundamentalist parties.)
The other 8% must be for small, probably Sunni Arab or Kurdish, parties not so far detailed by the Arabic press.
There are strange things about this poll. First, it gives the major Kurdish coalition only 10%. The Kurdistan Alliance got 21% in December, 2005, or 53 seats. It is true that the Kurds lost out in the expansion of the number of seats in parliament, insofar as they have only had 43 seats set aside for the Kurdistan superprovince, or 13%. But Kurds in the mixed provinces of Kirkuk, Diyala and Ninevah should return some seats for the Kurdistan Alliance or one of its challengers. Moreover, there is no reason for a weighted poll to reflect seat apportionment. This poll is missing half the Kurds who should have turned up in it, and they can’t all be in the 8% that wasn’t detailed. That gap is a major flaw.
Second, the Sunni Arab parties have also disappeared. The Iraqi Accord Front gained 44 seats or 15% in December, 2005, and the National Dialogue Front of Salih Mutlak won 11 seats or 4%. So Sunni Arab parties should also have shown up as nearly 20 percent of the poll results. Instead the IAF has been reduced to 2.6%, and no other Sunni Arab parties are mentioned, though some might be in the unannounced 8%. That poor black hole of 8% cannot magically cover both the missing Sunni Arabs and the missing Kurds. Some proportion of the missing Sunni Arabs may be supporters of Allawi’s National Iraqi List, but can that possibility really account for this anomaly? A lot of Sunni Arabs have not forgiven Allawi for cheerleading the US military’s invasion of and virtual destruction of Fallujah in late fall of 2004.
It is true that Allawi went to visit Saudi Arabia recently in hopes of receiving King Abdullah’s backing as the secular alternative to the pro-Iranian Shiite religious parties. And his coalition partner Tariq al-Hashimi is in Cairo, seeking Egypt’s backing. Al-Hashimi was constrained to deny that the National Iraqi coalition had sent an envoy to Tehran seeking Iran’s acquiescence in Allawi’s return as prime minister, because just such a rumor was flying around Iraq. The visits to Riyadh and Cairo are intended to position the Iraqiya as the secular, Sunni-Shiite alternative to rule by religious Shiites linked to the ayatollahs in Tehran. It is a message that will resonate in the Sunni Arab provinces.
I conclude that somehow this poll over-represented the Shiite Arabs at the expense of Kurds and Sunni Arabs. The National Media Center maintains that they polled in a weighted way in all 18 provinces, so its results should be proportional. But they clearly are not.
If we focus on the Shiite parties, the results make some sense in the light of the provincial elections of January, 2009, when Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coaltion (the core of which is his Islamic Mission (Da’wa) Party) took over a third of seats in the major urban centers of Baghdad and Basra, and did well in the Shiite provinces of the south, though not so overwhelmingly well.
In last year’s provincial elections, the Shiite fundamentalist Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, the core of today’s National Iraqi Alliance, virtually collapsed after having been dominant since 2005–though it still gained between 8% and 17% of the vote. The party suffered from an anti-incumbent mood, given poor services and bad security, as well as, allegedly, public distaste at how close it is to Iran. On the other hand, the hard line Sadr Movement, another constituent of the National Iraqi Alliance, did respectably in much of the Shiite South, gaining as much as 15-17% in some provinces. So the non-Da’wa Shiite religious parties could well gain as much as a fifth of the national vote if the trends visible in the provincial elections have continued.
Allawi’s Iraqi National Movement only got 9% in the December, 2005 elections, but it has been reformulated away from being mainly Shiite secularists to being cross-sectarian, and presumably some of the 20% who said they would vote for it were Sunni Arabs. The INM was joined by Tariq al-Hashemi, a vice president and a Sunni Arab who formerly led the Iraqi Islamic Party, and by Salih Mutlak, the secular, Sunni Arab leader of the National Dialogue Front. Mutlak’s disqualification from running because of allegations of links to the banned Baath Party, and his recent call for his supporters to boycott the vote, could hurt Allawi’s poll numbers if the poll were taken now.
For this and other reasons, I doubt Allawi’s list will actually get 20% of seats in the new parliament. Iraqis have a discourse of national unity to which the list is appealing in its rhetoric. And Iraqis typically are embarrassed by sectarianism and deny its importance. But when they have gone to the polls in the past 5 years, they have almost always voted for ethnic or sectarian parties once in the privacy of the voting booth. There was also buzz for Allawi in fall of 2005 coming from polls done in the provinces by US AID and from the American Enterprise Institute (so I was told by journalists who interviewed us both), and it turned out not to amount to anything; Allawi’s contingent in parliament shrank from 14% to 9%.
The poll also gave some provincial estimates for voter support for al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition:
Baghdad: 32%
Basra: 41%
Babil: 49%
Dhi Qar: 42%
Karbala: 50%
Qadisiya: 56%
Muthanna: 44%
These numbers, if true, speak of a revolution in affairs since last year’s provincial election, since the State of Law only won 9% in Karbala then, and the most it got outside the two big Shiite cities was 23%. Because these results are so divergent from those of only a year ago, I have trouble accepting them as accurate. Services and security aren’t better, and unless al-Maliki is buying off constituents with patronage, it is hard for me to understand such a big swing in his favor.
There may also be a fear effect. Al-Maliki has been establishing tribal militias in the Shiite south loyal to him, and has moreover gotten control of a lot of the local police forces as well as the national army, so Iraqis may be reluctant to say to pollsters that they oppose him.
This poll suggests that al-Maliki’s party will pull in about 108 seats in the 325-seat parliament, and that Allawi’s list will get 72.
But the Shiite religious coalition, the National Iraqi Alliance, has done its own soundings, and thinks it will get 70-80 seats or as much as 25% of seats, not the 17% the National Media Center gives them. And the NIA thinks that 80 would make them the single largest party.
Although not all their leaders agree with such a strategy,it still seems most likely that al-Maliki’s State of Law and al-Hakim’s National Iraqi Alliance will make a post-election coalition, emerging as the largest bloc in parliament and forming the government again. Assuming al-Maliki’s party doesn’t actually get 30%, such a coalition might be the only way for him to remain prime minister, assuming he hasn’t burned too many bridges with the other Shiite religious parties to be viable.
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AP – The leader of Lebanon’s Shiite movement Hezbollah recently delivered an odd but deeply important political message to his followers: Heed traffic signs and pay your electric bills.
Tomgram: Michael Schwartz, Will Iraq's Oil Ever Flow? | TomDispatch
Sociologist Michael Schwartz, a sharp Iraq-watcher and author of a provocative book on the Iraq War, surveys the travails of Iraq’s oil industry since the 2003 Bush-Cheney invasion and points to the continued difficulties of the Iraq petroleum industry.
My own guess is that eventually the security situation will settle down enough to allow the foreign petroleum companies now signing bids to develop specific fields to press forward. It will be a long slow haul, but Iraqi petroleum will likely come online over time. When that expansion of production happens,it will have a big impact on Iraq. There will be massive internal migration of labor to the Basra and other oil-rich areas, mixing up Sunni Arabs and Kurds with regional labor migrants from e.g. Egypt, India and Pakistan.
The Neoconservative dreams that Iraq would rival or replace Saudi Arabia as swing producer, and that it would recognize and perhaps supply petroleum to Israel, however, are both unlikely developments. Moreover, as China, India and other Asian giants begin growing more rapidly and depending on automobiles, demand for petroleum could well grow so fast over the next twenty years that any new big fields’ production is just slurped up, with the world demanding more. That is, Rupert Murdoch’s notion that Iraq production could plunge prices down to $14 a barrel for the long term, helping industrialized economies, was always stupid, since it did not take account of rapidly growing demand from Asia.
The emergence of Iraq as a petroleum state (or rather a bigger, wealthier petroleum state) will also further upset the geopolitical balance in the Middle East. With a Shiite majority, it will offset Saudi Arabia in the Sunni-Shiite culture wars. It seems likely to have a big, well-trained and effective army, which cannot always be depended on to be allied with the interests of Washington. A military coup down the road cannot be ruled out (there are few democratic oil states, where petroleum supplies more than a third of the national income). And, it likely will be a friendly and supportive big brother to movements like Hizbullah in Lebanon. While it won’t always be on the same page as Iran, it will likely be an ally of and support for Tehran. One possibility is that a rich Iraq 20 or 25 years from now will be in a position to promote Twelver Shiism in the region, picking up some of the Alevis in Turkey, the Nusairis in Syria and the Zaidis in Yemen. With its possession of the Shiite holy cities of Najaf and Karbala, with the enormously influential chief cleric of Najaf as among its more prominent residents, Iraq’s soft power among Afghan, Pakistani and Indian Shiites has the potential for being greater than that of Iran.
In the end, an oil-rich, Shiite-dominated Iraq is far more likely to be a victory for the Shiite revival kicked off in 1979 by Imam Ruhollah Khomeini than a triumph for Richard Perle, Paul Wolfowitz, Daniel Pipes and the other hard line warmongers who advocated for a revolution-by-invasion in Iraq.
But Schwartz is correct that all these developments are likely a decade or more off.
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